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DROWNING IN A SEA OF CONTRACT: APPLICATION OF
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE TO FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
The economic loss rule is stated with ease but applied with
great difficulty.... Lawyers and judges alike have found it
difficult to determine when the rule applies and when an
exception is appropriate.'
The economic loss rule is one of the most confusing doctrines
in tort law.2 The rule defines the boundary between the overlap-
ping theories of tort law and contract law by barring the recov-
ery of purely economic loss in tort, particularly in strict liability
and negligence cases.3 The rationale behind the rule is that
contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) are ex-
pressly designed to deal with disappointed economic expecta-
tions and, therefore, the recovery of economic losses.4 Confusion
arises, however, when courts apply the economic loss rule to
torts that expressly provide for the recovery of purely economic
losses,5 such as misrepresentation.6
1. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
2. See Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster that Ate
Commercial Torts, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1995, at 34, 34 ("[Ilt is clear that judges, lawyers,
and commercial clients alike are all desperately struggling to define the parameters
of the economic loss doctrine.").
3. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
5. Torts that allow the recovery of economic loss include, but are not limited to,
defamation, conversion, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and tortious inter-
ference with business advantage. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116A, at 843-44, § 119, at 887-88, § 130, at 1006 (5th ed.
1984); see also Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) ("Purely 'economic loss' may be recover-
able under a variety of tort theories."). Unlike misrepresentation, courts readily con-
clude that the economic loss rule does not apply to other torts that permit the recovery of
economic loss. See, e.g., Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 973 F.2d 988, 998 (1st
Cir. 1992) (explaining that the law permits recovery of economic loss for intentional
torts, such as defamation); Pershing Indus. v. Sanz, 740 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding the economic loss rule does not bar claims for conversion and civil
theft); Facchina v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 735 So. 2d 499, 502-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (having "little trouble in concluding" that the economic loss rule did not bar defa-
mation and invasion of privacy).
6. Throughout this Note the generic term misrepresentation includes both inten-
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In states adopting the economic loss rule, courts struggle with
the questions of if, when, and how the economic loss rule should
apply to claims arising out of a defendant's fraudulent conduct.
Accordingly, courts have designed diverse rationales in deter-
mining when, and if, the economic loss rule should bar recovery
in a misrepresentation claim.7
Illustrating the diverse application of the economic loss rule is
the different treatment of similar claims involving the same
defective product, fire-retardant treated (FRT) plywood.' In the
mid-1980s, the American Plywood Association notified its mem-
bers that FRT plywood was subject to thermal degradation.9
Despite this warning and without disclosing the dangers, the
manufacturers continued to promote and sell the product.10 As
roofs deteriorated, they posed a risk of collapsing." Accordingly,
tional (i.e. fraudulent) and negligent misrepresentation. When the discussion focuses
on a particular claim, the discussion will be so distinguished by reference to a par-
ticular type of misrepresentation.
7. See All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting the various applications of the economic loss rule to misrepresentation
claims).
8. FRT plywood is a chemically treated plywood designed to resist fire that was
used as roof sheathing on buildings, including residential homes. See Pulte Home
Corp. v. Ply Gem Indus., 804 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
9. See Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 639 A.2d 147, 149-50 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 667 A.2d 624 (Md. 1995). When FRT plywood
is exposed to elevated temperatures (alleged by the plaintiffs to begin at 130" fahr-
enheit) a chemical reaction occurs that destroys the bond between the plywood lami-
nates and weakens the wood, resulting in deterioration, loss of strength capacity,
and impairment of structural integrity. See Morris, 667 A.2d at 628. The plaintiffs
claimed that roofs can reach temperatures of 180 fahrenheit without being exposed
to fire. See id. They further alleged that the reaction inevitably occurs in roofs,
without regard to ventilation or moisture levels in attics. See id.
10. Although the manufacturers did not disclose the defective condition of the FRT
plywood, the public learned of its dangers on April 11, 1990, most notably through a
front page article in the New York Times. See Iver Peterson, A Plywood Used in
Many Homes Is Found to Decay in a Few Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1990, at Al.
11. See, e.g., Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (alleging personal injuries suffered by a homeowner working on
a roof who fell through the roof constructed of FRT plywood); Citizens Ins. Co. v.
Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 314, 315 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (alleging
FRT-plywood roof collapsed on business); King-Bradwall Partnership v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (seeking recovery from the man-
ufacturer for damage to a roof after a worker fell through a roof constructed of FRT
plywood); see also Morris, 667 A.2d at 629 n.3 (alleging instances of homeowners
falling through roofs constructed of FRT plywood and further, that local fire depart-
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homeowners and builders sought to recover the cost to repair or
replace the roof-a classic example of purely economic loss.' In
each case, the plaintiff(s) alleged that the defendants' misrepre-
sentations as to the suitability of FRT plywood as roofing ma-
terial induced the purchase of the product.
13
The Maryland courts dismissed the homeowners' negligent
misrepresentation claims because the "plaintiffs [could not]
recover in tort for.., purely economic losses,"14 even when privity
of contract barred the plaintiffs' contract claims. 15 While Mary-
land law would permit recovery if the FRT-plywood roof had
collapsed and damaged other property' 6 (e.g., the contents of the
home), Michigan law does not provide such an exception. 7 When
a Michigan restauranteur's FRT-plywood roof collapsed and
destroyed his business, the Michigan courts dismissed his fraud
claim because "the UCC provide[d] the exclusive remedy." 8
Because the defective FRT plywood did not deteriorate and de-
stroy his business within the UCC's four-year statute of limi-
tations, no remedy was available. 9
Although Maryland and Michigan courts afforded no recovery,
Florida courts allowed a homebuilder's negligent misrepresenta-
tion and fraud claims that sought to recover the cost of replacing
ments cautioned fire fighters not to walk on roofs containing FRT plywood).
12. For further discussion of the meaning of economic loss, see infra notes 27-36
and accompanying text.
13. See Cintron, 681 So. 2d at 862; Morris, 667 A.2d at 629; Citizens Ins., 585
N.W.2d at 317; Klng-Bradwall Partnership, 865 S.W.2d at 20.
14. Morris, 667 A.2d at 631.
15. The homeowners had purchased homes that contained FRT-plywood roofs.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs were not in privity with the manufacturer and the court
held that a product sold as part of a constructed home did not constitute a consumer
product. See id. at 637-38.
16. See id& at 630 (noting that under Maryland law, the economic loss rule does
not apply where a defective product has damaged other property).
17. See Citizens Ins., 585 N.W.2d at 316 ("Unlike some jurisdictions, the economic
loss doctrine applies in Michigan even when the plaintiff is seeking to recover for
property other than the product itself.").
18. Id.
19. See ic at 317. Unless the restauranteur knew of the product defect prior to
the roof crashing in, the statute of limitations would not have barred the tort claim
because, unlike a contract claim in which the statute of limitations begins to run
from the date of delivery, a tort claim's statute of limitations runs from the date on
which the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the defect. See infra notes
238-44 and accompanying text.
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all the FRT plywood in homes the home builder had construc-
ted.2" The Florida economic loss rule barred claims for strict
liability and negligence, but did not apply to torts that were
independent of the contract, such as fraud and negligent misrep-
resentation, even when warranty law also afforded recovery.2'
Although the Florida plaintiffs claims were nearly identical to
those of the Maryland homeowners, the economic loss rule did
not apply.22 Similarly, Virginia law allowed homeowners' fraud
claims," even though the condominium owners also had a viable
contract claim.24 Unlike Florida, the Virginia economic loss rule
would have barred negligent misrepresentation claims. Finally,
Alabama allowed an architect's fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation claims seeking purely economic losses without any
mention of the economic loss rule.26
As the FRT plywood cases demonstrate, states do not apply
the economic loss rule uniformly to nearly identical fraud and
negligent misrepresentation claims. The first section of this Note
20. See Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 738
(11th Cir. 1995).
21. See id. at 742; see also id. at 738 n.13 (noting that Florida law treated the
fraud and misrepresentation claims identically).
22. See id. at' 742. The plaintiffs misrepresentation claims ultimately failed, be-
cause the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove the misrepresentation
claims, not because they were barred by the economic loss rule. See id.
23. See Providence Village Townhouse Condominium Ass'n v. Amurcon-Loudoun
Corp., No. 12206, 1994 WL 740045, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1994). Although the
plaintiffs' fraud claims were dismissed for failing to plead with sufficient specificity,
the dismissal was with leave to replead. See id.
24. See id. at *4. In contrast to the law in Michigan or Maryland, the Virginia
UCC does not require privity between the plaintiff and the defendant for the plain-
tiff to recover under a breach of warranty theory, so long as the plaintiff is someone
whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume,
or be affected by the goods. See id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Michie
1991)).
25. See Tidemark Bank for Sav., F.S.B. v. Morris, No. 94-1598, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15170, at *11 (1st Cir. June 19, 1995) ("Virginia has chosen not to recognize
tort claims to recover purely economic loss for negligently supplied misinformation
absent privity between the parties." (citing Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628,
631-32 (Va. 1993) (finding that unlike fraud, negligent misrepresentation is not an
exception to the economic loss rule))).
26. See Chambless-Killingsworth & Assocs., P.C. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.,
695 So. 2d 25 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). The architect sought recovery for damages to
his business reputation and loss of income as a result of the architect's use of FRT
plywood in a local school. See id. at 27.
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provides a general overview of the economic loss rule and its
rationale. The second and third sections examine the application
of the economic loss rule to fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims respectively. The fourth section analyzes these rules
and suggests a rule that is the most consistent with both the
purpose of the economic loss rule and the tort of misrepresenta-
tion.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE EcoNoMIc Loss RULE
Defining an "Economic Loss"
Generally, the phrase "economic loss" is defined as losses
other than those resulting from an injury to the plaintiffs per-
son or other property." Economic loss is divided further into
direct and consequential, or indirect, economic loss.28 Direct
economic loss is the difference between the value of the contract
or product as promised, and the actual value as delivered.29 In
the context of products liability, direct economic loss occurs
when a product is damaged and the buyer seeks to recover the
price of the product."0 Direct economic loss can be measured in
several ways. First, an "out-of-pocket" loss provides recovery for
the difference in value between what is given and what is
received.3 ' Second, "repair costs" provide the cost of replacement or
repair to a product that is not delivered as promised. 2 Third,
the "benefit of the bargain" approach measures the difference
between the value of what is received and the value as repre-
27. See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 968 (E.D. Wis.
1999); see also Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990)
(distinguishing the "economic loss" cost of "replacing a defective product ... from an
injury to the plaintiffs person or property").
28. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1966) [hereinafter Note, Economic Loss]; see also Comment,
Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541-42 (1966) (discussing judicial application of
the economic loss principle). Courts frequently cite these two articles for a definition
of a purely economic loss. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327
(Ill. 1982); Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Wis. 1991).
29. See Note, Economic Loss, supra note 28, at 918.
30. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980), overruled on other grounds, 435 N.E.2d 443 (111. 1982).
31. See Note, Economic Loss, supra note 28, at 918.
32. See id.
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sented."3 Consequential or indirect economic loss consists of an
injury extrinsic to the product and attributable to the product
defect, such as lost profits resulting from the inability to make
use of the product.3 4
As Judge Posner has explained, the term "economic loss" is a
misnomer: "It would be better to call it a 'commercial loss,'...
because personal injuries and especially property losses are eco-
nomic losses, too-they destroy values which can be and are
monetized...."3 Commercial losses are not confined to trans-
actions involving business entities; rather, the term encompasses
any contractual dispute involving disappointed economic expec-
tations.36
The Economic Loss Rule
The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine, 37 first
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Seely v. White
Motor Co.8 In Seely, the plaintiff sought damages resulting from
the purchase of a defective truck.3 9 The plaintiff suffered no
33. See id.
34. See Moorman Mfg., 414 N.E.2d at 1305; see also Seely v. White Motor Co.,
403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (upholding the plaintiffs recovery of lost profits); Note,
Economic Loss, supra note 28, at 918 ("Consequential economic loss includes all
direct loss, such as loss of profits resulting from inability to make use of the defec-
tive product.").
35. Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). The
term "commercial loss" did not originate with Posner. The Seely decision described
the damages sought by a plaintiff as "commercial losses" (and interchangeably "eco-
nomic losses"), see Seely, 403 P.2d at 150, as have other courts adopting the eco-
nomic loss rule, see, e.g., Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex.
1977).
36. See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 968 (E.D. Wis.
1999) (explaining that "commercial injuries are the type on which a breach of con-
tract or breach of warranty suit is based.").
37. The "economic loss rule" is also referred to as the "economic loss doctrine."
Whatever the name, the principle is the same.
38. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965); see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (identifying Seely as the
leading case propounding the economic loss rule). Although Seely is the best known
case, it was not the first case to find that a plaintiff could not "sue directly the
manufacturer [in negligence] . . .for damage limited to the allegedly defective prod-
uct itself." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
39. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 147.
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personal injury damages in the accident, but sought damages for
the repair of the truck, the purchase price of the truck, and lost
profits because of an inability to use the truck.4" Recognizing the
overlap between products liability and contract law, the Seely
court held that in the absence of personal injuries or physical
injury to property other than to the product, a buyer's sole remedy
lay in warranty, not strict liability or negligence.4
Today, courts routinely apply the economic loss rule to both
strict liability and negligence claims.42 The economic loss rule,
simply stated, is as follows:
"[Where a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated
because the product he bought is not working properly, his
remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered
only 'economic' losses." This doctrine hinges on a distinction
drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for co-
mmercial purposes where economic expectations are protected
by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale
of defective products to individual consumers who are injured
in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort
to the law of torts.4 3
The rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely
economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can
40. See id. at 147-48.
41. See id. at 150-51. Although a negligence claim was not before the court, the
Seely court nonetheless concluded that "[e]ven in actions for negligence ... there is
no recovery for economic loss alone." Id. at 151; see also David B. Gaebler, Negli-
gence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593, 620-21 (1986) ("Ironically...
Seely reaches this question only in dictum.. .. In the twenty years since the Seely
decision, this dictum has been cited so frequently to deny tort recovery of economic
loss in products cases that it seems almost to be the foundation of the rule.").
42. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871 (1986) (finding that, in admiralty law, no recovery exists under a negligence or
strict products liability theory when a defective product only injures itself); Transport
Corp. of Am., Inc. v. IBM, 30 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The economic loss
doctrine in Minnesota bars recovery under the tort theories of negligence or strict
liability for economic losses. .. ."); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d
1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Whether the complaint is cast in terms of strict liability
in tort or negligence should make no difference.").
43. Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992) (empha-
ses added) (quoting Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396
S.E.2d 369, 371 (S.C. 1990)); accord East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 858; Seely, 403
P.2d at 145.
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demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual prom-
ise." Quite simply, the economic loss rule "prevent[s] the law of
contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other."
Rationale for the Economic Loss Rule
The distinction drawn by the economic loss rule reaches to the
heart of the differences between the underlying purposes of tort
and contract law.46 The distinction between tort and contract law
rests upon the source of the duty,47 the role that the parties' play
in determining their rights and responsibilities,48 and the time
at which duties and obligations are determined.49
Contract law is individualistic because contractual duties and
assignment of risk arise from agreements between the parties.5"
Contract law operates on the premise that contracting parties,
in the course of bargaining for terms of a sale, are able to allo-
cate risks and costs of the potential nonperformance. 51 The un-
derlying assumption is that the contract is the result of an
arms-length negotiated transaction.52 In a negotiated transac-
tion, the buyer either may insist on additional warranties or
may assume a greater risk in exchange for a lower price.5
44. See Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. 1982); see also East
River S.S., 476 U.S. at 873, 874 n.9 (explaining that, whereas contract damages
generally protect the benefit of the bargain, tort damages are more analogous to
reliance damages).
45. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 968 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
46. See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.
1985).
47. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1981).
48. See St. Denis v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 900 F. Supp. 1194, 1202
n.11 (D. Alaska 1995); see also Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 615 (explaining that tort
law "protects society's interest in freedom from harm" while contract law protects
.society's interest in the performance of promises" (quoting Spring Motors Distribs.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985))).
49. See St. Denis, 900 F. Supp. at 1202 n.11.
50. See id.
51. See Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 615.
52. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1994); see
also Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998) ("When the economic loss rule
has been applied, the parties usually were in a position to bargain freely concerning
the allocation of risk .... ").
53. See Detroit Edison, 35 F.3d at 240.
1796
DROWNING IN A SEA OF CONTRACT
In contrast, tort law is paternalistic because tort duties arise
from policy considerations with little or no regard to whether an
agreement exists between the parties.' As a general proposition,
"[t]ort law... governs the relationship between a [buyer] and a
[seller], where it is impractical or impossible... to negotiate
either the terms of a sale or each party's duty to the other."
55
Thus, tort duties arise to protect individuals unable to protect
themselves from the unscrupulous actions of others and irrespec-
tive of the existence of a contract.
Both a contract claim and a tort claim, however, may arise
from the same conduct.5" For example, when a defective product
physically harms the purchaser or his property, recovery is pro-
vided in both tort and contract.57 To the extent that the legal
theories overlap, they are said to be competing interests.58 The
purpose of the economic loss rule is not to bar the recovery
of economic losses but is to prevent parties from recovering in
tort to extricate themselves from prior freely negotiated agree-
ments.59
The economic loss rule applies where the duties owed are
created solely by contract.60 The focus of whether a plaintiff may
maintain an action in tort for purely economic losses turns on
the source of the duty that the plaintiff claims the defendant
owed. 1 If the duty arises merely out of the parties' agreement,
then the proper remedy is in contract;6 2 if the duty arises inde-
54. See St. Denis, 900 F. Supp. at 1202 n.11; Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 616.
55. Detroit Edison, 35 F.3d at 239.
56. See Roebher Films v. American Airlines, No. 85-Civ-1072, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10998, at *7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1989) (citing Carmania Corp., N.V. v.
Hambrecht Terrell Intl, 705 F. Supp. 936, 938 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
57. See Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d
369, 371 (S.C. 1990) (quoting Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d
730, 736 (S.C. 1989)).
58. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
59. See In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 893 P.2d 438, 446
(N.M. 1995).
60. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 737 (S.C.
1989).
61. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding,
Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995).
62. Framed another way, the conduct must be tortious despite the existence of a
contract. See Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 636 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1980).
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pendently of any contractual duties, then the proper remedy is
in tort.
63
The economic loss doctrine relies on three rationales to pre-
serve contract law as a generally superior remedy for breaches
resulting solely in economic loss.' An overview of these princi-
ples and rationales serves to illuminate when the doctrine should
be applied to misrepresentation claims. First, contract law per-
mits the parties to negotiate the allocation of risk.65 As parties
to a contract are better suited to allocate risk and negotiate
terms of the contract, 66 courts should not interfere when equally
positioned parties fairly negotiate a contract. 67 In such situa-
tions, parties to a contract do not need the special protections of
tort law.61 Indeed, permitting parties to sue in tort over a con-
tract dispute allows the parties to rewrite the agreement by
allowing a party to recoup a benefit that was not part of the
bargain.69 By refusing to extricate parties from the bargains that
63. See id.
64. Some commentators and courts have criticized these underlying assumptions,
or the application of the economic loss rule when the assumptions are not present,
particularly in nonnegotiated or noncommercial cases. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
National Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("[A] personal injury
is not necessarily a more overwhelming misfortune . . . than is an economic loss."),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 435 N.E.2d 443 (111. 1982); cf. Utah Intl, Inc. v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 775 P.2d 741, 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (applying the economic loss
rule only "when there is no great disparity in bargaining power").
65. See Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (CBC) 680, 683-684 (E.D.N.C. July 23, 1998).
66. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp.
1549, 1557 (D.S.C. 1993). "Even where the law acts to assign risk through implied
warranties," risk may be shifted through the use of disclaimers. 2000 Watermark
Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (4th Cir. 1986).
67. See City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446
(4th Cir. 1990); In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 893 P.2d 438, 446
(N.M. 1995).
68. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 826 F. Supp. at 1557.
69. Judge Crabb explained in Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F.
Supp. 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1997) that:
Commercial entities are capable of bargaining to allocate the risk of loss
inherent in any commercial transaction. Courts should assume that par-
ties factor risk allocation into their agreements and that the absence of
comprehensive warranties is reflected in the price paid. Permitting par-
ties to sue in tort when the deal goes awry rewrites the agreement by
allowing a party to recoup a benefit that was not part of the bargain.
Id. at 1230.
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they have struck, the economic loss rule encourages parties to
consider the possibility that the product will not perform prop-
erly and either assign risk or negotiate the price accordingly.7"
Consequently, contract damages are limited to those within the
contemplation of the parties framing their agreement.
Second, in the event of a breach, the UCC and contract law
are better suited to remedy disappointed economic expecta-
tions. 1 The essence of the UCC is to provide a complete and
independent statutory scheme to govern all commercial transac-
tions resulting from a party's failure to perform a contract.7 2 Al-
lowing a plaintiff a choice of recovery would undermine the need
for contract law, because plaintiffs find tort remedies more at-
tractive.7" Consequently, tort law would swallow the carefully
construed rules of the UCC and contract law.
Finally, preventing parties from extricating themselves from
freely bargained contracts also prevents unending liability.74 The
economic consequences of any single accident are virtually limit-
less,75 and thus, "[i]f defendants were held liable for every
economic effect of their negligence, they would face virtually
uninsurable risks far out of proportion to their culpability, and
far greater than is necessary to encourage.., care in their en-
deavors."7 6 Such unending liability would decrease certainty and
70. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1994).
71. See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992)
("'Contract principles ... are generally more appropriate for determining claims for
consequential damage that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their
agreement" (quoting Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660,
672 (N.J. 1985))).
72. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990). The UCC
was not, however, designed to eliminate a cause of action for fraud or misrepresen-
tation as the Code specifically contemplates additional causes of action for fraud and
misrepresentation. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-721 (1999); infra notes 254-60 and accom-
panying text.
73. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.
2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. 1993). Generally, plaintiffs prefer tort because it permits greater
damages and avoids the restrictions of contract. See id.
74. See id. at 1247; Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Sav-
ing Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV.
591, 594-95 (1995).
75. See In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ill. 1997).
76. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is debatable
that such liability would be "unending" as tort law also requires that damages be
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predictability in allocating risk,7 7 and thereby impede future
business activity and contract negotiation. 78 At the bottom of all
the rationales is one simple principle: "The economic loss doc-
trine helps ensure that contract claims are resolved by contract
law."
7 9
Status of the Economic Loss Rule Today
The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the economic loss
rule in the context of admiralty law in East River Steamship
Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval Inc.8" In a unanimous decision,
the Court recognized the importance of products liability in
protecting people from dangerous products, but also emphasized
that if products liability "were allowed to progress too far, con-
tract law would drown in a sea of tort."s" Accordingly, the Court
adopted the economic loss rule and held that a manufacturer in
a commercial relationship could not be held liable "under either
a negligence or strict products-liability theory" to the buyer for
purely economic losses.8 2 The Court, however, explicitly refused
to resolve whether the economic loss rule applied to all tort
actions in admiralty.83 Clearly, the Court left open the question
of whether the economic loss rule applied to misrepresentation.
Following East River, state courts increasingly adopted the
economic loss rule.84 A few states have declined to follow the
proximately caused, or foreseeable. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
77. See Griffith v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 969 P.2d 486, 491 (Wash. Ct. App.
1998), review denied, 980 P.2d 1283 (Wash. 1999).
78. See id.
79. Dinsmore Instrument Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 199 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir.
1999).
80. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520
U.S. 875 (1997), the Court recently affirmed and explained further the holding of
East River as it applies to other property. See id. at 876-82.
81. East River, 476 U.S. at 866 (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
87-94 (1974)).
82. Id. at 871.
83. See id. at 871 n.6.
84. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d
Cir. 1995) ("[Alpplication of the [economic loss rule] gained momentum when the Su-
preme Court adopted it in the context of admiralty products liability law."). After
East River, the leading opponent of the economic loss rule, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey revisited its twenty-year-old rejection of the economic loss rule in Santor
v. A&M Karagheusian, 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). In Spring Motors Distributors, Inc.
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economic loss doctrine,"5 but the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions have adopted the economic loss doctrine in one variation
or another.8 6 These variations generally concern whether the
economic loss rule applies (1) to "ordinary consumers,""7 (2) to a
v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that a commercial buyer's remedies for economic losses were restricted to
those provided by contract law. See id. at 671-73. Then in Alloway v. General Ma-
rine Industries, L.P., 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997), the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that allowing a consumer to recover purely economic losses in tort was no
longer necessary. See id. at 275.
85. See, e.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ark. 1981);
Alloway, 695 A.2d at 271 ("Only a handful of jurisdictions have followed Santor" in
rejecting the economic loss rule); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d
709 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying Oklahoma law). Some states that initially adopted
Santor were overruled by their legislatures. See, e.g., Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (Wash. 1994) (stating that the legis-
lature had overruled the Washington Supreme Court's adoption of Santor). More
commonly, courts that once adopted the Santor rule later adopted the economic loss
doctrine. Compare Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1970) (adopting the Santor rule), with Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc.,
486 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992) (adopting the economic loss doctrine). The continu-
ing validity of the minority position found in Santor remains suspect as an increas-
ing number of lower courts adopt the economic loss rule, despite prior decisions
allowing recovery of purely economic loss in tort. Compare Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975) (adopting Santor), with Terrones v. Tapia, 967
P.2d 216, 220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (applying the economic loss rule), and Jardel
Enters., Inc. v. Triconsultants, Inc., 770 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(adopting the economic loss rule); compare C&S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524
F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (allowing recovery of economic loss in tort), with Bowl-
ing Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F. Supp. 134, 136 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (applying the economic loss rule only in a commercial setting).
86. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.
2d 1244, 1246 n.2 (Fla. 1993).
87. Cf East River, 476 U.S. at 869 n.4 (1986) ("Interestingly, the New Jersey and
California Supreme Courts have each taken what appears to be a step in the direc-
tion of the other since Santor and Seely."). For an overview of states adopting a
consumer exception, see, for example, Minnesota Forest Prods., Inc., v. Ligna Mach.,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (D. Minn. 1998) ("Minnesota law limits recovery for
economic loss that arises from the sale of goods in a commercial setting."); Mainline
Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (D. Vt. 1996) (hold-
ing that an ordinary consumer who suffers purely economic loss may recover under
products liability theories of negligence or strict liability); Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v.
Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671, 672 (Ala. 1989) (adopting the economic loss rule
for "a claim solely for damage to the product itself ... which was for commercial
use, as opposed to consumer use"); Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491
N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn. 1992) (recognizing a consumer exception); Rousseau v. K.N.
Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999) (limiting the economic loss rule to com-
mercial transactions that do not involve consumers).
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defective product that poses an unreasonable risk of harm, but
has caused only economic loss to the product itself,8" or (3) out-
side of a products liability context.8 9 Although the rule originated
in the context of products liability, the current trend expands
the rule to apply in other contexts, most notably in real property
transactions9" and service contracts.91 As courts expand the eco-
nomic loss rule outside of UCC transactions, the looming ques-
tion is whether the economic loss rule applies to misrepresen-
tation claims.
THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE APPLIED TO FRAUD CLAIMS
Although the economic loss doctrine is now over thirty years
old, its application to fraud claims is relatively recent.92 Prior to
the adoption of the economic loss rule, courts routinely awarded
purely economic damages when a defendant's misrepresentation
induced a transaction.3
88. See Alloway, 695 A.2d at 273. Although the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 (1997) seemingly adopts the Seely analysis to exclude re-
covery under tort theories for damage to a product itself, the comments explain that
"[a] plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous [in these
respects (i.e. discovery of the defect prevented harm from occurring or the only harm
was to the product itself, but not to other persons or property)] rather than merely
ineffectual, should be governed by the rules governing products liability law." Id.
cmt. d.
89. See Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 96 n.11 (D. Mass.
1998) ("Some jurisdictions have expressly limited the economic loss doctrine to prod-
uct liability claims."). Compare Cargill, Inc. v. Boag Cold Storage Warehouse, Inc.,
71 F.3d 545, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the economic loss doctrine applies
only to products liability), and Scap Motors, Inc. v. Pevco Sys. Intl, Inc., No. CV
970348461S, 1999 WL 643378, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999) (refusing to
apply the economic loss rule outside of products liability), with Sun Co. v. Badger
Design & Constructors, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 365, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting the
Cargill approach).
90. See, e.g., Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 690 P.2d 158, 164 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Casa Clara Condominium, 620 So. 2d at 1244; Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441
N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982).
91. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla.
1987); Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1986).
92. "[Oinly a handful of jurisdictions" had addressed the issue before 1995. See
Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 544
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d
1302, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (considering and rejecting the application of the eco-
nomic loss rule to fraud claims), affd in part, rev'd in part, 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill.
1982).
93. See, e.g., Haarberg v. Schneider, 117 N.W.2d 796 (Neb. 1962) (finding that the
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The rules for recovery in fraud inherently conflict with the
economic loss rule. Fraud expressly allows for the recovery of
purely economic losses arising out of a defendant's misrepresen-
tations in a sale of goods or other property.94 Conversely, the
economic loss rule prohibits the recovery of purely economic
losses in tort-particularly when the claim arises out of a con-
tract.9 " The courts' struggle with this conflict can be categorized
into three approaches.
Fraud: An Exception to the Economic Loss Rule
The first approach exempts fraud, or fraudulent inducement,
from the economic loss rule based on three rationales.96 The
California Court of Appeals indirectly addressed this issue in
Kahn v. Shiley, Inc.,97 when the recipient of a defective heart
valve alleged that the manufacturer's misrepresentations about
the quality and durability of the heart valve induced her to
purchase the product.9" The court distinguished the other tort
claims by explaining that, "[a]llegations of fraud.., are in a
proper measure of damages in fraud is the difference between the value represented
and the actual value); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736 (N.M. 1940) (holding defrauded
purchaser could recover the difference between the real and represented value of the
automobile); Clouse v. Chairtown Motors, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973)
(allowing recovery of purely economic loss in fraud). In order to prove fraud, a
plaintiff must show (1) a misrepresentation (false statement, concealment, or nondis-
closure), (2) scienter (i.e., knowledge of falsity), (3) intent to defraud (i.e., induce reli-
ance), (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shiley,
Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (1990); KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 105, at 728, §
106, at 736-37.
94. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 110, at 766.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
96. See Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 872, 887 (N.D. Iowa
1999) ("In many jurisdictions, claims for fraud are an exception to the economic loss
doctrine."); Council of Unit Owners of Sea Colony E. v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs.,
Inc., Nos. 96C-AU-49, 86C-AU-50, 86C-AU-51, 86C-AU-52, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS
412, at *15-*16 (Oct. 16, 1990) ("Fraud is a recognized exception to the limitations
of the economic loss doctrine.").
97. 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Ct. App. 1990). Clearly, under California law, fraud
includes the ability to recover purely economic losses. See Alliance Mortgage Co. v.
Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 609 (Cal. 1995) (stating that the general rule in California
is that a defrauded party is ordinarily entitled to "out-of-pocket" loss); Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 1989) (allow-
ing recovery of purely economic loss for fraud arising out of a commercial contract).
98. See Kahn, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
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class by themselves.... Unlike the other theories, in which the
safety and efficacy of the product is assailed, the fraud claim
impugns defendants' conduct."99 Rather, the Kahn court con-
firmed "that a manufacturer of a product may be liable for fraud
when it" misleads potential users about material product infor-
mation. °° Thus, the viability of a fraud claim rests on the
defendant's conduct and not on the type of damage or on the
existence of an underlying contract.'' Clearly then, fraud allows
the recovery of purely economic loss because the presence or
absence of physical injury makes no difference." 2
By analyzing the source of the duty, the Texas Supreme Court
utilized a similar rationale to conclude the economic loss rule
did not apply to intentional misrepresentation.13 In Formosa
Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors, Inc., the Texas
Supreme Court distinguished an action in contract as breaching
a duty arising out of the parties' agreement from a tort action
that arises from a breach of a duty imposed by law.E4 Tort law
"has long imposed a duty to abstain from inducing another to
enter into a contract through the use of fraudulent misrepresen-
tations."' °5 As this duty is "separate and independent from the
duties established by the contract itself,"' 6 the economic loss
99. Id. at 112.
100. Id.
101. See id.; see also Continental Airlines, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (allowing a fraud
claim arising out of a contract between two commercial entities). The California Civil
Code expressly declares unlawful "[all contracts which . . . exempt anyone from re-
sponsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another
.. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985).
102. See Davis v. Shiley, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 833 (Ct. App. 1998) (Sills, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 828 n.3 (acknowledging the dissent's position on this issue
as correct).
103. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960
S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998). Indeed, the Formosa court expressed disapproval at lower
court decisions that overextended the economic loss rule. See id. at 47; see also East-
man Chem. Co. v. Niro, No. Civ. A G-99-623, 2000 WL 94931, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
24, 2000) (noting Formosa's disapproval of overextension by lower courts).
104. See Formosa, 960 S.W.2d at 45 (quoting International Printing Pressmen &
Assistants' Union v. Smith, 198 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex. 1946)).
105. Id. at 46.
106. Id. Although the Texas Supreme Court has adopted an "independent injury"
requirement for other torts, fraud is exempt from that requirement. See Eastman,
2000 WL 94931, at *5.
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rule does not apply to fraud claims regardless of whether the
duties were subsumed later into the contract, or the losses were
purely economic.107
In one of the earliest cases addressing the issue, Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.," 8 the Illinois Supreme
Court expended one sentence in affirming the decision of the
court of appeals that intentional misrepresentations were out-
side the scope of the economic loss rule.1" 9 Rather than focus on
the defendant's conduct, the court of appeals explained only that
the "loss of the bargain" is the measure of damages for fraud:
Illinois courts have traditionally taken the position that "loss
of bargain" is the measure of damages for misrepresenta-
tion.... [Olur Supreme Court [has] stated: "In an action on
the case for fraudulent representations in the sale of property,
the measure of damages is the difference between the value
of the property as it is and what it would be worth if the
representations had been true.""0
Since the time of the Moorman decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court has clarified that "the concept of duty" is the rationale for
this exception to the economic loss rule."' This approach treats
fraud as an exception to the economic loss rule because (1) fraud
impugns the defendant's conduct, (2) the source of the duty arises
out of tort, not contract, and (3) the measure of damages for
fraud is purely economic "benefit of the bargain" damages. Ac-
cordingly, a plaintiff may maintain both a fraud and a contract
action simultaneously." 2
107. See Formosa, 960 S.W.2d. at 46-47. Texas and Illinois are not alone in this
analysis. See, e.g., Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 89 (S.C. 1995) (recognizing that a breach of a duty
arising independently of contractual duties may support a tort action for economic
loss).
108. 435 N.E.2d 443 (IMI. 1982).
109. See id.
110. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1312 (111. App. Ct.
1980) (quoting Schwitters v. Springer, 86 N.E. 102, 103 (IMI. 1908)), overruled on
other grounds, 435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982).
111. 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd.,
555 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ill. 1990).
112. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Delaney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. 1991)
(explaining that even where a contract exists, '[if the defendant's conduct...
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Fraud: A Limited Exception to the Economic Loss Rule
Despite the long-standing rule allowing recovery of purely
economic loss damages in fraud cases, two states recently limited
recovery in fraud cases to only those damages unrelated to an
underlying contract. Indeed, the growing trend among courts is
to craft a limited exception to claims for economic loss in fraud
cases.
113
The leading case advocating a limited exception for fraud is
the Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Huron Tool & Engi-
neering Co. v. Precision Consulting Services, Inc."4 Prior to Hu-
ron Tool, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the economic
loss rule in negligence cases" 5 and explained that "where a
plaintiff seeks to recover for economic loss caused by a defective
product purchased for commercial purposes, the exclusive remedy
is provided by the UCC ... .""' In that context, the Michigan
Court of Appeals addressed the application of the doctrine to
actions for intentional torts, particularly fraud."7 Although the
give[s] rise to [independent] liability... the plaintiffs claim may also sound in
tort"); see also Nepomuceno v. Knights of Columbus, No. Civ. A-96-C-4789, 1999 WL
66570, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999) (allowing the plaintiffs to maintain fraud ac-
tions despite the existence of contract claims and losses that were purely economic);
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Arthur Bros., Inc., 882 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(permitting recovery for fraud despite the existence of contract claims).
113. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14565, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 7, 1998) ("There is a current trend allowing a
limited exception to the economic loss doctrine for fraud where the claims at issue
arise independent of the underlying contract."). The so-called Huron Tool rule has
been adopted by courts in Florida, see HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses,
685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996), Minnesota, see AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137
F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F.
Supp. 2d 738 (D. Minn. 1999), South Carolina, see South Carolina Elec. & Gas v.
Westinghouse Elec., 826 F. Supp. 1549 (D.S.C. 1993), and Wisconsin, compare
Raytheon v. McGraw-Edison Co., 979 F. Supp 858 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (adopting the
rule), with Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wis.
1998) (rejecting the rule), and Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 34 F. Supp.
2d 720 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (denying reconsideration despite a split within the district).
114. 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); see Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1144
(stating that Huron Tool is the leading case).
115. See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992).
Prior to Neibarger, lower courts in Michigan, as well as courts within the Sixth Cir-
cuit, had applied the economic loss doctrine for a number of years. See id. at 617.
116. Id. at 618.
117. See Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 544-46.
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Huron Tool court recognized that fraud in the inducement
presented a special situation, because misrepresentations under-
mine the ability to negotiate freely,1 8 the court added an addi-
tional caveat: The fraud claim must be factually distinguish-
able." At first glance, this rule creates an exception for fraud
claims. Yet the additional caveat requires that the misrepresen-
tations be unrelated to the contract 20 If the defendant's misrep-
resentations concerned the subject matter of the contract-the
quality of the goods, for example-then they are said to be
"interwoven" with the contract.2 1 If the fraud claim is "interwo-
ven" with a contract claim, then no independent intentional
misrepresentation exists. In such a case, the economic loss rule
restricts the plaintiff to whatever contractual remedies exist.122
The result in Huron Tool is perhaps the best example of how
the Michigan rule operates. The Huron Tool plaintiffs convinced
the court of appeals that fraud was an exception to the economic
loss rule, but the misrepresentations at issue in the case con-
cerned the quality and characteristics of the goods. Although the
defendant's representations about the quality of the goods fraud-
ulently induced the plaintiffs to contract, the court determined
those claims to be indistinguishable from the terms of the con-
tract.1' Accordingly, because the fraud claims were not "inde-
pendent," the economic loss rule barred the fraud claims.'
In formulating this rule, the Huron Tool court relied heavily
on the parties' ability to negotiate the terms of commercial
transactions. 5 Subsequent decisions have extended the rule to
118. See id. at 545.
119. See id. at 546.
120. See id. Even a fraud allegation concerning representations "'made in connection
with the making of a contract'" has been interpreted to be "not extraneous to the
contract." Dinsmore Instrument Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 199 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir.
1999) (emphasis added) (quoting from Dinsmore's complaint).




125. See id. at 545. The court explained that the policy behind the doctrine "en-
courages parties to negotiate economic risks through warranty provisions and price."
Id. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899,
901 (Fla. 1987)). The court also concluded that the quality and characteristics of the
goods were not extraneous to the contract because the parties were still free to
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nonnegotiated transactions126 and consumers. 27 Moreover, the
practical effect of the additional requirement has rendered the
exception a nullity. 2 ' No court correctly applying the Huron Tool
rule has found that a misrepresentation was independent of the
contract. 1
29
Florida nominally adopts the Huron Tool rule.. in barring the
recovery of purely economic losses. The crucial difference be-
tween how Florida and Michigan handle the application of the
rule in misrepresentation cases lies in the decision of when the
economic loss rule should apply. Rather than apply a per se rule,
the Florida courts determine whether the economic loss rule
applies to a fraudulent inducement claim on a case-by-case
basis.'
31
The Florida Supreme Court recently acknowledged that its
own "pronouncements on the economic loss rule have not always
been clear."132 The lack of clarity of the Florida economic loss
negotiate the warranty and other terms in order to account for possible defects in
the goods. See id.
126. See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 314 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998) (finding no fraud in the inducement exception even when the buyer
was not in a position to negotiate the terms of the sale); see also id. at 318 (Kelly,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that the economic loss rule should apply only when the
plaintiff is in the same business as the defendant and may anticipate properly the
foreseeability of the risks involved).
127. See, e.g., Parkhill v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 983 (D. Minn.
1998) (applying the economic loss rule to fraud claims by consumers who purchased
insurance policies).
128. See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146-49 (E.D.
Wis. 1998) (declining to adopt the Huron rule).
129. See id. at 1146 n.2.
130. See Pressman v. Wolf, 732 So. 2d 356, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explain-
ing that "the [Florida] Supreme Court adopted the analysis and explanation in Hu-
ron Tool"). Though Florida has adopted the Michigan rule, see HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas
Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996), it applied a similar
rule even prior to Huron Tool, see Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a party cannot recover in tort for
economic losses incurred pursuant to the terms of a written contract).
131. See Force v. ITT Hardford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852
(D. Minn. 1998) (applying Florida law and explaining that "Florida courts have not
adopted a per se rule regarding whether the economic loss rule applies to claims of
fraudulent inducement; rather, such a determination depends on the specifics of each
case").
132. Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., Nos. 93,336, 93,126, 1999
WL 983857, at *5 (Fla. Oct. 28, 1999).
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rule derives from conflicting statements in the supreme court
decision in HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, SA."8 The
Florida Supreme Court recognized that fraudulent inducement
"occurs prior to the contract and the standard of truthful rep-
resentation placed upon the defendant is not derived from the
contract,""3 and explained that the "economic loss rule has not
eliminated causes of action based upon torts independent of the
contractual breach."" 5 While the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized that fraudulent inducement was "an independent tort in
that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the
breach of contract,"'36 the court also adopted the analysis of Hu-
ron Tool 7 and stated that a tort action exists only for "inten-
tional or negligent acts considered to be independent from acts
that breached the contract."
3 8
A number of lower Florida courts have interpreted these con-
flicting statements to require a bar similar to the one that the
Huron Tool court imposed: "[W]here the alleged fraudulent mis-
representations are inseparably embodied in the parties subse-
quent agreement."3'9 Unlike Michigan courts, however, Florida
courts recognize that a fraudulent inducement claim can coexist
with a contract claim. 40 Nonetheless, the decision of the oft-
quoted statement from the Florida Third District Court of
Appeals demonstrates the conflicting concerns and interests of
applying the economic loss doctrine to fraud claims:
133. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
134. Id. at 1239 (quoting Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (en banc) (Altenberad, J., dissenting)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1239-40.
138. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
139. Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (contending that certain fraudulent inducement claims are barred by the
economic loss rule); cf supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
Huron Tool rule).
140. See Force v. ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (D.
Minn. 1998) (interpreting Florida law and noting that "[tihe court in HTP ... ex-
pressly rejected... [the idea that] fraudulent inducement claims cannot co-exist
with breach of contract claims"); Parkhill v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 995 F.
Supp. 983, 993-94 (D. Minn. 1998) (interpreting Florida law and citing HTP to reach
the same conclusion) HTP, 685 So. 2d at 1238-40 (rejecting Woodson v. Martin, 663
So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (en banc)).
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It makes sense that a truly independent cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation, where the ability of one party
to negotiate fair terms is undermined by the other's fraud-
ulent behavior, is not barred by the economic loss rule. How-
ever, where the only alleged misrepresentation concerns the
heart of the parties' agreement, simply applying the label of
"fraudulent inducement" to a cause of action will not suffice




These conflicting and unclear statements regarding application
of the economic loss rule have led to a two-fold result. First, the
Florida rule has sustained fraud as a viable cause of action,
albeit through widely inconsistent results. 42 Second, the Florida
appellate courts have been deluged with a large number of cases
on the applicability of the economic loss rule to fraud claims."
141. Hotels of Key Largo, 694 So. 2d at 77. Other Florida appellate panels accept
the third district court of appeal's Key Largo pronouncement. See, e.g., Wadlington v.
Continental Med. Servs., Inc., 728 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (Fourth
District); Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. GGV Assocs., Ltd., 710 So. 2d 702,
704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Fifth District). But see Bradley Factor, Inc. v. United
States, No. 95-1147-CIV-T-176, 2000 WL 224618, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2000)
(rejecting Key Largo in light of the Budgetel decision).
142. Compare Pressman v. Wolf, 732 So. 2d 356, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(barring a fraud claim because a party may not recover in fraud for oral misrepre-
sentations set forth in a written contract), with Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1999) (allowing a fraud claim
because "the presence of a merger clause [is not] an impediment") (citing Wilson v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 662 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)); com-
pare Techni-Search v. Pathtech Software Solutions, Inc., 737 So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App. 1999) (finding "[als to the fraud claim . . . no amendment can get by
the economic loss rule"), with Davich v. Norman Bros. Nissan, Inc., 739 So. 2d 138,
141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding "no merit in [defendant's] position that the
economic loss rule bars [plaintiffs] counts for fraud"); compare Watkins v. First Eq-
uity Corp., 743 So. 2d 525, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting a contention
that the relationship created by contract mandated the application of the economic
loss rule), with Williams v. Peak Resorts, Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 513, 516-17 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a plaintiff may not recover under both contract
and fraud theories unless the plaintiff proves separate damages for fraud), and Clay-
ton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1999) (explaining that when allegations of pre-contract misrepresentation are directly
related to the breach, they do not support an independent tort action).
143. Florida easily has the largest number of judicial opinions discussing the ap-
plication of the economic loss rule to fraud claims and quite often has conflicting
opinions from the appellate courts on the issue.
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To date, the Florida Supreme Court has not articulated a clear
application of the economic loss rule to fraud claims.
Fraud: No Exception
A handful of courts have construed the economic loss rule to
prohibit the recovery of purely economic losses in fraud. These
courts conclude that because the economic loss rule bars recov-
ery in tort, and because fraud is a tort, recovery of purely eco-
nomic loss is therefore barred.' For example, in Flagg Energy
Dievelopment Corp. v. General Motors Corp. Allison Gas Turbine
Division,14 a commercial plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
misrepresentations about the quality of some engines fraudu-
lently induced it to purchase them.1' Connecticut law afforded
recovery for purely economic loss in fraudulent inducement
claims'47 and allowed a fraud claim in addition to a warranty
claim.14 The Flagg Energy court nonetheless distinguished prior
fraud cases because they did not involve the sale of goods. 49 The
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's reasoning
that fraud claims cannot arise out of a transaction governed by
the UCC."5°
144. See, e.g., Nigrelli Sys., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (analyzing a plaintiffs strict liability and fraud
claims together and concluding that the economic loss rule applied "equally" to all
the claims); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL-991, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18207, at *21-*22 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1995) (construing the New York eco-
nomic loss rule to bar fraud claims). The court in Bronco II relied solely on New
York's adoption of the economic loss rule to conclude that New York law barred the
recovery of economic losses in fraud. See id The Bronco II and Nigrelli decisions are
perhaps limited to products liability, because the cases involved defective products.
See id. More importantly, the Bronco II court probably misconstrued New York law
in determining that the economic loss rule would bar a fraud claim. See Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 743-48 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing
district court's dismissal of a fraud claim that sought purely economic losses); see
also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981) (al-
lowing damages after a jury verdict).
145. No. CV-92-02421985, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2624 (Oct. 1, 1993).
146. See id.
147. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-721 (West 1999).
148. See id. cmt.
149. See FMagg Energy, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2624, at *5-*10; see also Unique
Dimensions, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., No. CV94-04-73-025, 1995 WL 404875
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 1995) (reaching the same conclusion).
150. In Flagg Energy Development Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075
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Although Flagg Energy involved a commercial purchaser in a
fully negotiated transaction that was subject to the UCC, whole-
sale application of the economic loss rule to fraud is not limited
to such cases. Courts have utilized similar rationales to apply
the economic loss rule and bar fraud claims brought by consumer
purchasers of defective products, 5' and fraud claims unrelated
to a sale of goods.' 52 The tacit directive of such decisions is to
disallow fraud claims that do not seek damages for physical
injury.
THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE APPLIED TO NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
Unlike fraud, which has ancient roots in the common law, 5 '
negligent misrepresentation is a more recent development."
(Conn. 1998), the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's decision
regarding a dispute over the settlement agreement. In concluding the settlement
agreement in Flagg Energy did not extinguish the terms of the original contract, the
Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the economic loss rule applied to fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims-at least those that the UCC governed. See
id. at 1088-89; Page v. Englander Millwork Co., No. CV9803329085, 1999 WL
311225, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 1999) (explaining that the Flagg Energy de-
cision held that claims of both negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation are incon-
sistent with "breach of contract and breach of warranty allegations under the
[UCCI"); see also Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d
738, 750 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that the Minnesota economic loss doctrine does
not treat fraud differently when alleged in connection with an Article 2 contract).
But see Scap Motors, Inc. v. PEVCO Sys. Intl, Inc., 1999 WL 643378, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999) (declining to apply the economic loss rule because the
UCC did not govern the claims).
151. See Page, 1999 WL 311225, at *2-*3 (dismissing the homeowner plaintiffs'
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims based on Flagg Energy); see also
Pryor v. Shiley, Inc., No. 89-3559, 1990 WL 159582, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1990)
(affirming the dismissal of a consumer plaintiffs fraud claims because "Oregon treats
all product liability actions the same, regardless of the theory asserted").
152. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 681 F. Supp. 287, 290-91
(W.D. Pa. 1988). The dispute in Sundstrand centered around a professional services
contract. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant made misrepresentations during
their precontractual negotiations, thus suggesting a fraud in the inducement claim.
See id. (discussing the preliminary proposals and "the arm's 'length nature of the
negotiations"); cf. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 87 (S.C. 1995) ("[Slome states use the 'economic loss'
rule to prohibit all recovery of purely economic damages in tort.").
153. See 9 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:3 (1992).
154. See id. § 32:76.
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The three approaches to negligent misrepresentation 55 all rest
on the same basic principle, first explained by Justice Cardozo
in Glanzer v. Shepard.'56 In Glanzer, the New York Court of
Appeals held a public weigher liable to a third-party buyer of
beans, because the weigher knew that the buyer would rely on
the weigher's representations when purchasing the beans from
the seller.'57 Justice Cardozo explained the court's reasoning:
[Tihe law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller....
[A]ssumption of the task of weighing was the assumption of a
duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct
was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in
terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it
has none the less [sic] an origin not exclusively contractual.
Given the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by
law.158
Although a contractual relationship existed only between the
buyer and the weigher, the law imposed a legal duty on the
weigher to those who, like the bean buyer,'59 would foreseeably
rely on his misrepresentations. Thus, negligent misrepresenta-
tion imposes a legal duty on those who supply information in the
155. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) adopts the holding of
Glanzer v. Sheppard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), and provides in relevant part:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552. The akin-to-privity approach defines and
limits the scope of the defendant's duty according to the defendant's state of mind
and agreed upon expectation of the parties. See Onita Pac. Corp. v. Trustees of
Bronson, 843 P.2d 890, 908 (Or. 1992). The foreseeability approach is an expansive
approach that allows recovery to third parties "to the extent that damages incurred
by non-clients are reasonably foreseeable." First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco
Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Scottish Heritage Trust v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 1996) (comparing the three
approaches).
156. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
157. See id.
158. Id. at 275-76. In a later decision, Justice Cardozo made it clear that negligent
misrepresentation was not a substitute for fraud. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
159. See Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
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course of a business transaction in which they have a pecuniary
interest.6 °
A tension emerges between negligent misrepresentation,
which allows for the recovery of pecuniary loss, 61 and the eco-
nomic loss rule, which forbids recovery of economic loss in tort.'62
This tension has produced "substantial disagreement among the
courts as to whether a claim for negligent misrepresentation
should be recognized as an exception to the economic loss doc-
trine."163 As with fraud, this tension has produced a variety of
approaches to determine when the economic loss rule should
apply to negligent misrepresentation.
Negligent Misrepresentation: An Exception Mirroring the
Fraudulent Inducement Exception
The first approach to negligent misrepresentation treats the
cause of action like fraud. Florida, the leading proponent of this
view,1" has fashioned its negligent misrepresentation exception
160. See Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 95 n.10 (D. Mass.
1998) (citing section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
161. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp.
1549, 1555 (D.S.C. 1993).
162. See McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co. v. First Union Management, Inc.,
622 N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ('[P]ecuniary loss' is by its very defini-
tion 'economic loss.'").
163. Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters of East River:
Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 268 (1997); see also
Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("There is no
consensus among courts that have been squarely faced with this issue."); John Mar-
tin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tenn. 1991) ("[Tihere is no clear
majority; instead, we find a split of authority among the states.").
164. Other jurisdictions follow this approach as well. See, e.g., Arthur D. Little
Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1189, 1204-06 (D. Mass. 1996); Niagra
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., No. 88-CV-819, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7721, at *90 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that when parties seek "recovery
for breach of a duty extraneous to the contract, the intentional tort and negligent
misrepresentation claims . . . could stand regardless of the vitality of the contract
claims"). Although the Dooyang court rejected a claim that mirrored the breach of
contract claim, it specifically did so because it was "not a claim for misrepresenta-
tion in the inducement of the contract." Dooyang, 928 F. Supp. at 1205. It should be
noted that the District Court of Massachusetts recently distinguished Dooyang, find-
ing that Massachusetts would not allow any negligent misrepresentation claims in-
volving a defective product. See Sebago, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 96. At least one Illinois
case has applied a Florida-style rule, treating negligent misrepresentation cases sim-
ilar to cases involving fraud in the inducement. See Budget Rent-a-Car Corp. v.
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to the economic loss rule to match its fraudulent inducement
exception. 165 The most recent Florida Supreme Court decision on
the issue, HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, SA. 166
clearly established that the Florida economic loss rule did not
apply to any torts independent of the contract: "Where a contract
exists, a tort action will lie for either intentional or negligent
acts considered to be independent from acts that breached the
contract."
167
Just as the economic loss doctrine does not preclude all claims
of fraudulent inducement, the economic loss doctrine does not
bar a negligent misrepresentation claim if it centers upon an
alleged inducement to enter into a contractual. relationship,
rather than performance of the contract. 16 Because the economic
loss rule applies identically to both fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation, widely inconsistent opinions have resulted-
Genesys Software Sys., Inc., No. 96-C-0944, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12123 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 22, 1996). The court in In re Ford Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL-991,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18207 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1995), applied a similar method to
evaluate claims under West Virginia, Indiana, Texas, and New York law. See id. at
*15-*23.
165. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996). It should also be noted that in Florida a claim of negligent misrepre-
sentation "that resembles fraud in the inducement may support a claim for punitive
damages." Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1025 n.31 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
166. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996). A brief per curiam opinion by the Florida Su-
preme Court in PK Ventures v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc., 690 So. 2d 1296
(Fla. 1997), confirmed the applicability of HTP to negligent misrepresentation. See
id. at 1297.
167. HTP, 685 So. 2d at 1239 (emphasis added); see also McCarthy v. Southern
States Utils., 698 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]lthough HTP in-
volved the tort of fraud, the high court was clear that any independent tort would
satisfy the economic loss rule . . .).
168. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dade County Esoil Management Co., 982 F. Supp. 873,
880-81 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Although a few Florida courts have differentiated negligent
misrepresentation from fraudulent inducement, such decisions appear to be a misin-
terpretation of Florida law. Compare Florida College of Osteopathic Med., Inc. v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 862, 866-67 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that
the economic loss rule barred the negligent misrepresentation claim but not the
fraudulent inducement claim), with Wadlington v. Continental Med. Servs., 728 So.
2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (analyzing both intentional and negligent misrepre-
sentation claims together under the economic loss rule), and Parkhill v. Minnesota
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 983, 995 (D. Minn. 1998) (interpreting Florida law)
("For the same reasons [plaintiffs] fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule,
so too is plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim.").
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with some courts focused on whether the tort claims "mirror"
breach of contract claims and others creating a nearly absolute
exception for negligent misrepresentation claims.169 The recent
Florida Supreme Court decision of Moransais v. Heathman17 °
suggests that the latter view is correct, 171 however, some courts
may still hold onto the former view.172 Until a more definitive
pronouncement comes from the Florida Supreme Court on both
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, the only clear direc-
tive is that the economic loss rule applies equally to both claims.
Negligent Misrepresentation: An Exception Limited to Defendants
in the Business of Supplying Information for the Guidance of
Others
Rather than extend identical exceptions for intentional and
negligent misrepresentation, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.173 recognized
a limited exception applicable solely to cases involving negligent
misrepresentation. 74 As one of the first states to discuss negli-
169. Compare Parkhill, 995 F. Supp. at 994-95 (relying on Hotels of Key Largo, Inc.
v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), to dismiss a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim in the formation of a contract), with Wassall v. Payne,
682 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that "where, as here, . . .
negligent misrepresentation in the formation of a contract [is] alleged, the economic
loss rule does not bar the tort action"); compare Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium
v. GGV Assocs., Ltd., 710 So. 2d 702, 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that
the economic loss rule applied to a third party's negligent misrepresentation claim),
with Williams v. Bear Stearns & Co., 725 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that the economic loss rule did not apply because there was no contrac-
tual relationship), and Wassail, 682 So. 2d at 679 (concluding "the lack of privity of
contract" did not bar the negligent misrepresentation claim).
170. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
171. See Stone's Throw Condominium Ass'n v. Sand Cove Apartments, Inc., No. 98-
02012, 1999 WL 1203829, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1999) (replacing its
earlier decision, No. 98-02012, 1999 WL 445685, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 2,
1999) (affirming dismissal of a negligent misrepresentation claim that mirrored the
breach of contract action), in light of Moransais).
172. See Monroe v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (concluding that Moransais's exception was generally constrained to its
facts).
173. 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
174. See id. at 452. In making this determination, the Moorman court relied on prior
Illinois cases allowing the recovery of purely economic loss for negligent misrepresen-
tation. See id. (citing Rozny v. Marnu, 250 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1969)). The Illinois "in
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gent misrepresentation in the context of the economic loss rule,
Illinois became a leading authority in the area.'75
A claim for negligent misrepresentation in Illinois exists only
against a defendant "who is in the business of supplying infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions
[and] makes negligent misrepresentations." 76 Because "the con-
cept of duty is at the heart" of the "Moorman doctrine," the
Illinois Supreme Court analyzed whether the duty is extracon-
tractual in resolving this question. 77 An exception does not ap-
ply when the information is conveyed merely as part of a sale or
contract.'78 Thus, a misrepresentation is not actionable against a
defendant who negligently supplied false information in the
course of a transaction.
The exception does not turn on the question of privity,'7 s but
rather, depends on the profession of the defendant and the na-
the business of supplying information" requirement actually predates the adoption of
the economic loss rule. See id. Thus, the Moorman court merely extended a preexist-
ing exception to the economic loss rule to cases involving negligent misrepresenta-
tion.
175. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp.
1549, 1557 n.4 (D.S.C. 1993) ("Illinois is one of the few jurisdictions with a plethora
of cases on the subject."). Other jurisdictions have adopted the Moorman court's
rationale. See, e.g., Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1496 (S.D. Iowa
1991); Laetsch v. Rockwell, InVl, No. 93-792, 1995 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 37 (Jan. 18,
1995); Tasco Constr., Inc. v. Town of Winchendon, No. 910308C, 1994 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 373 (Feb. 11, 1994); see also Richard P. Salgado, Negligent Misrepresentation
and the Economic Loss Rule, 22 COLO. LAW. 1689 (1993) (advocating that Colorado
adopt the Moorman doctrine for negligent misrepresentation).
176. Moorman Mfg. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 452 (citing Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d
656 (IlM. 1969)).
177. Lake County Grading Co. v. Lakes Agency, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (M11.
App. Ct. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Cordiant MN, Inc. v. David Cravit &
Assocs. Ltd., No. 96-C-4276, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12803, at *44.*45 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
19, 1997) (dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim because the information
supplied 'was ancillary to the sale").
178. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (III.
1997).
179. See id. at 1200 (overruling the third-party requirement). Prior to Fireman's
Fund, courts interpreting Illinois law required that the plaintiff be a third party.
See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. Miglin, No. 92-C-4059, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15439, at
*24 (N.D. IlM. Oct. 26, 1994); Grass v. Homann, 474 N.E.2d 711, 714 (I1. App. Ct.
1984); see also Norman Rilkind, Negligent Misrepresentation in Illinois: The Third
Party (Non)Requirement, 82 ILL. B.J. 668 (1994) (arguing against a third-party re-
quirement).
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ture of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. 8 ' If the
ultimate result of the relationship is something "intangible"-the
value of the services rendered lies in the ideas behind the prod-
uct and not the product itself-then the exception applies."8 ' illi-
nois courts have allowed claims against health care profession-
als, insurance brokers, accountants, and attorneys,8 2 but not
against advertising firms, architects, or engineers."a According
to the Illinois Supreme Court, the distinguishing characteristic
is that the former group have "long been held to be members of
a skilled profession. .. liable for their negligent failure to ob-
serve reasonable professional competence."'14
Although once a certain profession is exempted it is clear that
the Moorman doctrine no longer applies, this piecemeal determi-
nation of whether a particular profession owes some extra con-
tractual duty has left lower courts in the "position of guessing
which additional professionals [fall outside] ... Moorman's eco-
nomic loss doctrine." i8 5 Determining that the importance of an
accountant's duty is less tangible than an architect's provides
lower courts with little guidance regarding when the exception is
appropriate. 186 In short, the Moorman doctrine's "in the busi-
180. See Congregation of the Passion v. Touche, Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 515
(Ill. 1994).
181. See id. ("Application of the Moorman doctrine limiting recovery of purely eco-
nomic losses to contract, therefore, is inappropriate where a relationship results in
something intangible .. .).
182. See id. (allowing accountant malpractice claim); Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d
1185 (Ill. 1992) (finding that an attorney malpractice claim was not barred by the
economic loss rule); 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel
& Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (M11. 1990) (stating that the Moorman doctrine
would not bar actions against attorneys or health care professionals); Lake County
Grading, 589 N.E.2d at 1132 (allowing negligent misrepresentation claim against
broker because the relationship between the parties was a fiduciary one).
183. See Cordiant MN, Inc. v. David Cravit & Assocs. Ltd., No. 96-C-4276, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12803, at *44 (dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim
against an advertising firm); Fireman's Fund, 679 N.E.2d at 1201 (dismissing a
negligent misrepresentation claim against an engineer); Lincoln Park, 555 N.E.2d at
353 (dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim against an architect).
184. Congregation of the Passion, 636 N.E.2d at 515 (citation omitted).
185. Fireman's Fund, 679 N.E.2d at 1202 (Heiple, C.J., dissenting). The plethora of
cases that the Illinois Supreme Court has resolved on this issue is a testament that
the "distinguishing characteristic" has failed to provide any real guidance to the
lower courts. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (providing examples of
the cases that the Illinois Supreme Court heard on this issue).
186. Cf. Fireman's Fund, 679 N.E.2d at 1202 (Heiple, C.J., dissenting) (contending
20001 DROWNING IN A SEA OF CONTRACT 1819
ness "187 requirement has failed to articulate a precise formula
that will allow courts to apply the economic loss rule to negli-
gent misrepresentation claims.
Negligent Misrepresentation: An Exception Dependent on
Whether the Parties Are in Privity
A third approach recognizes the difference between negligent
and intentional misrepresentation and avoids the piecemeal
determination of the Illinois rule by focusing on the question of
privity.S8 Two of the leading cases advocating this approach,
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp. 189 and Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 9
involved factually similar claims. In each case, the plaintiffs ne-
gotiated contracts with the defendant to supply generators, with
certain specifications, for use at their nuclear power plants. 9'
After the generators deteriorated, the plaintiffs filed breach of
contract and negligent misrepresentation claims against the
defendant.
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In Duquesne, the Third Circuit utilized two rationales to apply
the economic loss rule to the negligent misrepresentation
that the court has not coherently differentiated among professional groups).
187. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (111. 1982).
188. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 620
(3d Cir. 1995); Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1995)
(applying Arizona law); Bailey Farms, Inc. v. Nor-Am Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 188, 191
(6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1549, 1557 (D.S.C. 1993) (applying North Carolina
law); Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Conn.
1998) ("[Clommercial losses arising out of the defective performance of contracts for
the sale of goods cannot be combined with negligent misrepresentation . . .");
Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 993 (Wash.
1994) ("[Wihen parties have contracted to protect against potential economic liability ...
contract principles override the tort principles in [the Restatement] and ... purely
economic damages are not recoverable .... ."); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan
Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Wyo. 1996) (adopting
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co.).
189. 826 F. Supp. 1549 (D.S.C. 1993).
190. 66 F.3d 604 (3d Cir. 1995).
191. See id. at 607-08; South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 826 F. Supp. at 1552-53.
192. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 826 F. Supp. at 1552-53; Duquesne Light,
66 F.3d at 608.
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claim. 193 First, the court found that ordinary contract principles
governed disputes between sophisticated business entities en-
gaging in arms-length transactions."9 Second, the court ex-
plained that negligent misrepresentation governs liability only
when contract remedies are unavailable.1 95 Accordingly, the
Third Circuit concluded that privity of contract between two
commercial parties eliminated the "need for an additional tort of
negligent misrepresentation."' 9 The South Carolina Electric &
Gas Co. court further distinguished negligent misrepresentation
from intentional misrepresentation because fraud requires a
"concomitant element of an actual intent to deceive."" Both
courts, however, suggested that the same rationale might not
apply to "an unsophisticated consumer who is party to a sales
contract."' 9 Under this approach, the economic loss rule bars the
negligent misrepresentation claims of "business sophisticates...
capable of protecting themselves by contractual agreement."99
This rule suggests that it does not apply to foreseeable third
parties. Accordingly, most courts adopting this rule recognize
that the lack of privity by a third party renders "commercial law
an inadequate framework" in which to resolve a third-party
193. See Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 620.
194. See id.
195. See id. (explaining that all of the examples in the Restatement involved lia-
bility to third parties).
196. Id.; see also Sun Co., Inc. v. Badger Design & Constructors, Inc., 939 F. Supp.
365, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (relying on Duqesne Light and concluding that as "[a]ll as-
pects of this controversy occurred within the setting of a private commercial transac-
tion between two sophisticated parties. The allegations implicate no other duties than
those contained in the Contract negotiated . . .").
197. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 826 F. Supp. at 1557 (emphasis added).
198. Id.; see also Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 619-20 (distinguishing prior negligent
misrepresentation claims brought by "the ordinary consumer"). At least one court,
however, has applied this rationale to consumers. See Griffith v. Centex Real Estate
Corp., 969 P.2d 486, 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) ("We hold parties to their con-
tracts.... [Wihen a contract allocates liability, the economic loss rule bars claims
of negligent misrepresentation by homebuyers against builder-vendors." (citation omit-
ted)).
199. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 826 F. Supp. at 1557. The South Carolina
Court of Appeals later adopted this rationale. See Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere
Indus. Equip. Co., 455 S.E.2d 183, 189 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on South Caro-
lina Elec. & Gas Co. and concluding that "negligent misrepresentation is not appli-
cable as a matter of law . . .under the economic loss rule").
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plaintiffs' claims. 20 Thus, an exception to the economic loss rule
allows tort liability when negligent misrepresentations induce
third parties who justifiably rely on the information.0 1
Despite the logic of this analysis-that third parties cannot
transform a contract claim into a tort claim "to escape some
roadblock to recovery"2 2--some courts have applied the economic
loss rule to negligent misrepresentation claims even when privity
is absent.03 Althbugh the parties may not be in privity, these
courts require that the parties must resort to contract law to
protect their economic expectations. ° Courts justify this ap-
proach by explaining that the "economic loss doctrine was de-
signed to prevent such a strategy"0 5 whereby the plaintiff could
recover benefits it was unable to obtain in contract negotia-
200. Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 480 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (apply-
ing Arizona law); see, e.g., Squish La Fish, Inc. v. Thomco Specialty Prods., Inc., 149
F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (allowing recovery by a third party who indirectly
relied on a negligent misrepresentation); Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., No. 90C-
JN-30, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 454, at *6-*7 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("[1It is clear that in
order ... to invoke a cause of action under negligent misrepresentation involving §
552, the plaintiff must show that the defendant supplied the information to the
plaintiff for use in business transactions with third parties."); Bates & Assocs., Inc.
v. Romei, 426 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("Privity is not required to sup-
port an action for negligent misrepresentation.").
201. See Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 694 F. Supp.
902, 906 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 300
S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. 1983); accord Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 480 n.4 (applying Ari-
zona law).
202. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Roxborough Village Joint Venture, 944 F. Supp.
827, 830 (D. Colo. 1996).
203. See, e.g., National Steel Erection, Inc. v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 899 F. Supp.
268, 274 (N.D. W. Va. 1995) (finding that the economic loss rule barred negligent
misrepresentation claims despite a lack of privity); Spancrete, Inc. v. Ronald E.
Frazier & Assocs., 630 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (precluding sub-
contractors from bringing negligent misrepresentation claims in construction cases);
Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1987) (rejecting negligent misrepre-
sentation claim by a contractor against engineers and architects that the owner
hired).
204. See supra note 203; infra note 205.
205. Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (M.D. Pa. 1990);
see also Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. GGV Assocs., Ltd., 710 So. 2d 702,
705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("[The premise of the rule is simply that a contract
action is more appropriate for recovering economic losses [even when the parties are
not in privity] .. . ."). Given that the plaintiff in Seely was in privity with the de-
fendant, the truth of this assertion is highly debatable. See supra text accompanying
notes 38-41.
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tions. °6 What these courts fail to explain is how a third party is
supposed to protect itself through contract negotiation when it is
not in privity to the contract.
Application of the economic loss rule to third parties bars
negligent misrepresentation claims even in the absence of any
contractual remedy or any other basis of recovery. °7 In addition,
some courts apply the economic loss rule to bar negligent mis-
representation claims by third parties and between commercial
entities in privity."8 Dual application of this rule-to both com-
mercial plaintiffs in privity and plaintiffs not in privity-would
relegate negligent misrepresentation claims solely to noncom-
mercial plaintiffs. Extension of this dual application to consumer
plaintiffs would eliminate negligent misrepresentation altogether.
Negligent Misrepresentation: No Exception
The final approach to resolving the tension between the eco-
nomic loss rule and negligent misrepresentation concludes that
"negligent misrepresentation is a species of negligence."2 9 Ac-
cordingly, no exception applies to negligent misrepresentation.
Although the Texas Supreme Court crafted an exception for
fraudulent inducement without a requirement of independent
injury in D.SA., Inc. v. Hillsboro Independent School District,210
206. See National Steel Erection, 899 F. Supp. at 274.
207. See, e.g., Palco, 755 F. Supp. at 1280 ("[Plaintiffs] inability to recover in con-
tract or warranty due to the lack of privity, although unfortunate, does not change
the fact that . . . remedies in this matter are limited by law."); Floor Craft Floor
Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ohio
1990) ("There is no nexus here that can serve as a substitute for contractual privity.").
208. Compare Eagle Traffic Control v. ADDCO, 882 F. Supp. 417, 420 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (holding that the economic loss rule bars claims when the parties are in priv-
ity), with Palco, 755 F. Supp. at 1280 (holding that the economic loss rule bars
claims when the parties are not in privity).
209. In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., MDL-1063, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11063, at *33 (E.D. La. July 30, 1996); see Nepomuceno v. Knights of Columbus, No.
96-C-4789, 1999 WL 66570, at *11-*12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999) (analyzing plaintiffs
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims together under the economic loss
rule); accord Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 844
F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Texas law); Essex Ins. Co. v. Blount,
Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that under Texas law "the
same reasoning applies to [bar] claims for negligent misrepresentation" and negli-
gence) (citations omitted).
210. 973 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1998).
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the Texas Supreme Court articulated three reasons why negli-
gent misrepresentation did not require a similar exception.
First, unlike fraudulent inducement, the measure of damages for
negligent misrepresentation did not include the "benefit of the
bargain."21' Second, the rationale for fixing a narrower scope of
liability for negligent misrepresentation lay in the difference in
the duty imposed-the duty of honesty versus the duty of care.212
Third, and finally, requiring only negligent inducement would
"potentially convert every contract interpretation dispute into a
negligent misrepresentation claim."213 Accordingly, merely negli-
gent misrepresentations require an independent injury (e.g.,
actual physical harm) to overcome the economic loss rule.214
Thus, the rule articulated by the Texas Supreme Court mirrors
the economic loss rule's application to negligence and strict lia-
bility.
Do FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
HAVE A FuTuRE?
The adoption of the economic loss rule by a majority of the
states and the Supreme Court indicates that the underlying
rationale to maintain a dividing line between tort and contract
is a sound policy with regard to unintentional torts.21 As the
211. See Hillsboro, 973 S.W.2d at 663.
212. See id. at 664.
213. Id.
214. See id. Although the Hillsboro court addressed the issue in the context of
parties in privity, the Texas Court of Appeals has utilized the economic loss rule to
bar negligent misrepresentation claims of a third party. See M.D. Thomson & Austin
Banister Joint Venture v. Espey Huston & Assocs., 899 S.W.2d 415, 422 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995).
215. See Cathco, Inc. v. Valentiner Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365,
368 (Utah 1997); D'Angelo, supra note 74, at 595 ("After East River, courts continued
to follow [the economic loss rule] . . . recognizing the sound policy reasons . . ").
Despite the nearly universal acceptance of the economic loss rule by courts, debate
still surrounds the merits of the rule, particularly outside the products liability context.
Critics have suggested that because tort law reduces physical injury to monetary
damages, the distinction between physical injuries and economic losses is a fiction
and that the rule penalizes prudent conduct by requiring plaintiffs to await physical
injury prior to recovery. See F. Malcolm Cunningham, Jr. & Amy L. Fischer, The
Economic Loss Rule: Deconstructing the Mixed Metaphor in Construction Cases, 33
TORT & INS. L.J. 147, 148 (1997). It has also been suggested that the purpose of the
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Supreme Court observed in East River, parties would be free to
extricate themselves from freely bargained-for contracts, and the
well-developed body of "contract law would drown in a sea of
tort without such a rule."216
A blind application of the doctrine, however, would eviscerate
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.217 Failing to cre-
ate a workable exception for misrepresentation claims ignores
the reality that fraud and contract can coexist peacefully in the
areas where the interests served by the two bodies of law
merge.218 Although tort and contract represent separate bodies of
law designed to deal with different functions, their purposes and
roles are not mutually exclusive.2 9 The fundamental intersection
of contract and misrepresentation is inevitable as misrepresenta-
tion arises in a contractual setting.22 °
The potential for eliminating misrepresentation claims by
overapplication of the economic loss rule is evidenced by the test
commonly employed by courts to determine when the economic
loss rule should apply. This test focuses on the "nature of the
injury": If the damages are purely economic, the rule applies.2
The problem with applying this test to misrepresentation is that
rule is merely judicial economy. See Geri Lynn Mankoff, Note, Florida's Economic
Loss Rule. Will It Devour Fraud in the Inducement Claims When Only Economic
Losses Are at Stake?, 21 NOVA L. REv. 467, 471 (1996).
216. East River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
217. See infra note 261 and accompanying text; see also Schwiep, supra note 2, at
42 ("[The economic loss rule, rotely applied, . . . [could] defeat what has been the
common law for decades .... ").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 (discussing the overlap of tort and
contract law).
219. See William C. Way, The Problem of Economic Damages: Reconceptualizing the
Moorman Doctrine, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1173.
220. Indeed, the concept of warranty law, now a part of contract law, originated as
a form of misrepresentation in the nature of deceit. See William L. Prosser, The Im-
plied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-19 (1943); see
also Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Tex. 1990) (discussing the quasi-con-
tractual origins of fraud claims).
221. See, e.g., Carmania Corp., N.V. v. Hambrecht Terrell Int'l, 705 F. Supp. 936,
938-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (using the rationale that "[i]f the damages suffered are of the
type remediable in contract, a plaintiff may not recover in tort" to bar plaintiffs
fraud claims) (citations omitted); Grace Petroleum Corp. v. Williamson, 906 S.W.2d
66, 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("[The nature of the injury most often determines which
duty has been breached.").
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misrepresentation affords contract-style economic loss damages.222
Unlike other tort claims that seek to compensate the injured
party, fraud seeks to remedy the wrong by restoring to the
plaintiff what the defendant has taken wrongfully.21 Conse-
quently, the majority of American courts have adopted a "benefit
of the bargain" rule for fraud claims. 2' As in contract, this mea-
sure of damages gives the plaintiff the benefit of what he was
promised and allows recovery of the difference between what
was received and the value to which the plaintiff was entitled,
based on the defendant's representations.22 This measure of
damages exists precisely because recovery in fraud seeks to re-
store to the plaintiff what the defendant has received.
The Advantages of Misrepresentation in the Recovery of Purely
Economic Losses
Despite the apparent similarity between fraud and contract
damages, the discussion of whether to allow recovery in misrep-
resentation versus contract is not purely academic. Allowing a
plaintiff to recover under a tort claim of misrepresentation has
several distinct advantages.2 First, contract law severely re-
stricts who may recover by its privity requirement. Although a
222. See supra notes 94-95, 161 and accompanying text.
223. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 110, at 765-66 ("Since the purpose [of
fraud] is not to compensate the plaintiffs loss, but to restore what the defendant
has received, the courts look to the inequity of allowing him to retain it, rather
than to the damage which the plaintiff has sustained."). Indeed, the recovery allowed
by fraud sets it apart from other tort claims that allow damages similar to reliance
rather than benefit of the bargain. See supra note 44.
224. See PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2.02[6][b][i],
at 2-33 (1989).
225. See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD § 2.2, at 21 (1988);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 110, at 768. It is noteworthy that for negligent mis-
representation, the majority of states allow the recovery of "out-of-pocket" damages.
See DUNN, supra, § 2.7, at 35.
226. This list merely illustrates the principal advantages of a fraud versus a con-
tract claim and is by no means exhaustive. Tort law may permit recovery where a
contract action will not normally lie due to lack of proof of a contract, want of con-
sideration, illegality, limitations imposed by the statute of frauds, or the parol evi-
dence rule. Tort law may also avoid defenses such as infancy or a discharge in
bankruptcy and some counterclaims. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 92-93, at
655-71.
227. See William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascen-
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number of states, through legislation or judicial decisions, have
limited or dispensed with a privity requirement in warranty
cases, the absence of privity still precludes warranty actions in
many states.228
Second, both express and implied warranties can be dis-
claimed. 229 The presence of a well-drafted merger clause can
limit the contract to the written agreement and thereby disclaim
any warranties made prior to the contract.2 30 Whereas a warranty
disclaimer will be inoperative if it is inconsistent with the ex-
press warranties, the UCC explicitly encourages disclaimers of
warranties. 23 1 Section 2-316 of the UCC provides that, wherever
reasonable, express warranties and disclaimers thereof will be
"construed... as consistent with each other."23 2 While a seller
may unscrupulously try to disavow a false statement by dis-
claiming a warranty in the contract agreement, it will not be
able to disclaim liability for fraud.2  Moreover, a court is more
likely to dispense with a warranty limitation under a tort theory
than under a contract claim.
2 34
dancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731, 783 (1990).
228. See id.; see also Hubbard v. General Motors Corp., 95 Civ. 4362 (AGS), 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6974, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) (finding that, absent privity
of contract, an indirect purchaser cannot recover mere economic loss under a breach
of warranty claim unless the product is a thing of danger).
229. See PETER ALCES & NATHANIEL HANSFORD, SALEs, LEASES & BULK TRANSFERS
§ 5.01, at 355 (1989); see also Twin Disc Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d
1329, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing a disclaimer of express and implied warran-
ties); Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 163 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (allowing a disclaimer of express and implied warranties). But see Mainline
Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (D. Vt. 1996) ("Ver-
mont has amended its § 2-316 to provide that sellers cannot exclude or limit their
liability in transactions involving ordinary consumers.").
230. See ALCES & HANSFORD, supra note 229, § 5.02, at 361-62.
231. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1999).
232. Id.
233. See Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (D.
Mass. 1996) ("[A] damage limitation clause in a contract does not bar recovery for
intentional misrepresentation in the inducement of a contract."); Noack v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explain-
ing that the presence of a merger clause is not an impediment for fraud); see also
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 177 (8th Cir. 1971) ("As-
suming, arguendo, that the trial court correctly found the warranty disclaimer valid,
we . . . find liability for fraud." (footnote omitted)); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
(SECOND) §§ 163, 164(1) (1981).
234. See Jones, supra note 227, at 790.
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Misrepresentation claims are particularly superior to implied
warrantyclaims. Theimplied warranty of merchantability does not
guarantee that a plaintiff received the product as represented by
defendant; rather, it requires only that the product serve the
"traditionally recognized purpose" for which it is used. 35 So long
as the product has operated in a "safe condition" and substan-
tially free of a manifest defect, the implied warranty of mer-
chantability provides no remedy.28 In contrast, fraud allows
recovery when a defendant has misrepresented the quality of the
good or has substituted an inferior product, regardless of whether
the product has actually failed.237
Third, misrepresentation claims may have a longer statute of
limitations. Typically, the statute of limitations for a contract
claim is four years.238 A contract may reduce, but not lengthen,
this statutory period to as little as a year.239 While tort claims
typically have a significantly shorter statute of limitations than
contract actions, the "discovery rule" allows plaintiffs a tort ac-
tion long after the contract claim has expired.24 In contract, the
statute of limitations begins at the time of the breach.4 1 In tort,
235. See U.C.C. § 2-314; see also Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287,
297-98 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding a car able to meet its "purpose" of providing "safe
reliable transportation"); Hubbard v. General Motors Corp., 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6974, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) (explaining that a car that
does not exhibit a design defect does not give rise to a breach of warranty claim).
236. See, e.g., Carlson, 883 F.2d at 297-98; In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 792, 803 (E.D. La. 1998) (dismissing a warranty claim due to the plaintiffs'
failure to allege that the air bags fimctioned improperly during their normal use);
Yost v. General Motors Corp., 651 F. Supp. 656, 657-58 (D.N.J. 1986) (dismissing an
implied warranty of merchantability claim where plaintiff experienced no actual
mechanical difficulties); Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595,
602 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing an implied warranty claim on tires with a latent de-
fect where the plaintiffs had not yet experienced product failure); Skelton v. General
Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181, 1191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (dismissing a claim where
there was no product failure despite an allegation that the manufacturer substituted
less desirable transmissions than those represented).
237. See Kahn v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Ct. App. 1990); Prince Mfg.
Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co., 31 N.E. 990, 994 (N.Y. 1892) (explaining that the
intentional substitution of inferior goods can constitute fraud).
238. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
239. See ALcES & HANSFORD, supra note 229, § 4.06, at 333.
240. See Borello v. United States Oil Co., 388 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis. 1986).
241. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2); ALCES & HANSFORD, supra note 229, § 4.06, at 333; see
also, e.g., Zhi v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 4:97-CV-404-Y, 1997 U.S. Dist.
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the statute of limitations begins to run only after the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury. 2 Even though the
warranty provisions also contain a deferral clause, "its applica-
bility is a rare exception."2 " In addition, fraud itself may have a
longer statute of limitations than a contract action or other tort
actions.2" Thus, in the case of a misrepresentation that does not
become known until after the contract statute of limitations ex-
pires, a plaintiff may still have a viable fraud claim.
Finally, fraud damages are more expansive than contract
damages. Because fraud is a tort, nearly every state allows puni-
tive damages for intentional fraud."4 Though punitive damages
should not attach for mere negligent misrepresentation, one who
intentionally perpetrates a fraud is "arguably a proper candidate
for punishment."246
In addition, although both contract and tort law limit damages
to those that are "foreseeable," the rules differ. The famous case
of Hadley v. Baxendale2 47 established two rules limiting liability
in contract cases. First, contract damages are limited to those
that arise naturally as a result of the breach. 2" Second, contract
LEXIS 20374, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 1997) ("A cause of action for breach of
warranty generally accrues at the time of the delivery, not at the time of discov-
ery.").
242. See Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc., v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1189, 1203 (D.
Mass. 1996) (applying discovery rule to a fraud claim); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Na-
tional Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (IA] cause of action for
misrepresentation does not accrue until the injury is discovered."), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982); Thurin v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc.,
Nos. 95-2415, 95-3127, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 819, at *23 n.8 (July 9, 1998) (stat-
ing that the discovery rule applies to misrepresentation but not to contract claims).
243. ALCES & HANSFORD, supra note 229, § 4.06, at 335; see also id. at 334-35
(discussing cases and rules governing the applicability of the deferral provision).
244. See generally Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1979) (discussing the statutes of limitations for fraud (six years), contract (four
years) and negligence (three years)).
245. See ALOES, supra note 224, § 2.02[GJ[b][iii], at 2-38; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 5, § 110, at 769; see also Dinsmore Instrument Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 999 F.
Supp. 968, 972 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (dismissing a punitive damage claim because the
Michigan UCC does not allow them).
246. ALOES, supra note 224, § 2.02[GI[b][iii], at 2-38.
247. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
248. See id. at 151 ("[T]he damages which the other party ought to receive . . .
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered . .. arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself. .. ").
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damages must "reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract,
as the probable result of the breach of it." 249 Proximate cause in
tort law does not focus on either the contemplation of the parties
or on the extent of the injury.2 0 Rather, a tortfeasor is liable for
all consequences that follow from his impact on the plaintiff, ex-
cept those that public policy limits. 251 Whereas fraud damages
must also be foreseeable at the time of the misrepresentation, no
case exists in which a defrauded party's proximately caused
consequential damages were unforeseeable. 2 The foreseeability
question highlights the necessity of a viable fraud claim for
misrepresentation, as a defrauded purchaser cannot "reasonably
be supposed" to contemplate that the other person is defrauding
them at the time of the sale. 53
The advantages of misrepresentation claims do not merely
illustrate the advantages of a tort versus a contract claim; rather,
these advantages illustrate the fundamental differences between
contract actions and misrepresentation claims. The scope of
these differences concern the circumstances in which recovery is
permitted and the extent of that recovery. As the purpose of the
economic loss rule is to prevent tort law and contract law from
dissolving into one another when they overlap, these differences
suggest that while both contract and misrepresentation arise out
of commercial transactions, each serves a complementary but
distinct purpose. Accordingly, this recognition must inform the
correct application of the economic loss rule to misrepresentation
claims.
The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is now codified in section 2-715(2) of the UCC.
249. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (emphasis added).
250. See KEETN ET AL., supra note 5, § 42, at 273.
251. See Way, supra note 219, at 1173; see also Hap's Aerial Enters., Inc. v. General
Aviation Corp., 496 N.W.2d 680, 683-84 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding to the trial
court with an allowance for the defendant to argue public policy grounds).
252. See DUNN, supra note 225, § 1.3, at 12-17.
253. "A party to a contract cannot rationally calculate the possibility that the other
party will deliberately misrepresent terms critical to that contract. Public policy is
better served by leaving the possibility of an intentional tort suit hanging over the
head of a party considering outright fraud." Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp.,
965 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
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What Should Be the Rule for Fraud?
Formulating the rule for fraud requires an understanding of
the interrelation between contract and fraud. In recognizing the
complementary, yet distinct nature of fraud, the UCC expressly
provides that principles of law and equity, including fraud and
misrepresentation, apply unless specifically displaced by the
Act.2" This provision is not an innovation of the UCC; commer-
cial law has long recognized that "fraud unravels everything."255
Despite the similarity between fraud and express warranty
claims, warranty law does not supplant fraud because fraud re-
quires additional elements.256 Unlike warranty, proof of fraud
requires an intentional act to deceive257 and proof of actual reli-
ance.2 18 Moreover, warranty and fraud claims serve distinct
purposes. Warranty claims arise from the existence of a contract
and therefore may be disclaimed according to the negotiations of
the parties in allocating risk of nonperformance.2 9 In contrast,
the duty not to engage in fraud to induce a contract is imposed
by law, regardless of the contract and may not be disclaimed
because parties cannot, and for public policy reasons should not,
"reasonably contemplate" the risk of fraud, as compared to non-
performance. 6
0
254. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UCC § 5, at 19 (2d ed. 1980); Steven C. Tourek et al.,
Bucking the "Trend": The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine,
and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 875, 880-84 (1999).
255. ALCES, supra note 224, § 3.03[1], at 3-5; supra notes 92-93, 105 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the long history of fraud in preventing misrepresentations that
induce contracts).
256. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 254, § 9-1, at 327.
257. See Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 46-47 (Tex. 1998); supra note 197 and accompanying text.
258. Compare Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. 1993) (reaffrming the
need to show actual reliance to establish fraud), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 533 (1977) (requiring justifiable reliance for fraud), and supra note 93
(discussing the elements of fraud), with Lennar Homes, Inc. v. Masonite Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (E.D. La. 1998) (finding that reliance is not required for a
breach of express warranty claim).
259. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the source of con-
tractual duties); supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales
of negotiation and risk allocation as underlying the economic loss rule); infra notes
274-79 and accompanying text (distinguishing fraud from contract actions).
260. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (explaining the source of tort
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Most courts recognize that fraud can be an exception to the
economic loss rule. Indeed, without Michigan's and Florida's
requirement that the allegations of fraud cannot be interwoven
into the parties' agreement, the rules in Michigan, Florida, Cali-
fornia, Texas, and Illinois would be identical. All three rules
would allow recovery of purely economic losses when the
defendant's misrepresentations fraudulently induced the plain-
tiff to enter into a contract. The only real differences between
the rules are how and when to determine that the fraud is not
merely a recasting of the breach of contract allegations.
Adopting the Flagg Energy court's rule would eviscerate fraud
claims.26' Under that rule, the UCC is the sole source of reme-
dies in defective product cases, regardless of whether the con-
tract to sell was procured by fraud. 62 Not only does this rule
ignore the explicit provisions of the UCC,263 the rule is unsound
for policy reasons as well. For example, a seller held liable only
for expectation damages-namely, the benefit of contractual
performance or a functional product-would, at worst, expect
recision of the contract.2 Because specific performance is rarely
granted and punitive damages largely forbidden under contract
law and the UCC,265 this approach fails to punish intentionally
duties arising from an inability to negotiate risk); supra notes 102, 104-07 and ac-
companying text (discussing the concept that the source of duty for fraud is one im-
posed by law); supra note 253 (explaining why parties cannot anticipate fraud when
negotiating); infra notes 266-68 (discussing the implications if the law were to re-
quire that parties could not rely on representations in commercial transactions).
261. See All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that a literal reading of the economic loss rule, as some courts have suggested,
would result in commercial fraud going "completely by the boards"); cf Brass v.
NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp 1427, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("[Dlefendant's argument would
result (practically speaking) in the Economic Loss Rule abolishing the tort of fraud
in the inducement altogether.").
262. See supra text accompanying notes 144-52.
263. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
264. See Davich v. Norman Bros. Nissan, Inc., 739 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining that if the plaintiff proves fraud, recission would be an im-
proper remedy because the parties would not be placed in their pre-sale positions).
265. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1999) (allowing specific performance only when the goods
are "unique or in other proper circumstances"); Dinsmore Instrument Co. v. Bombar-
dier, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 968, 972 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (dismissing punitive damages
claim because the UCC does not allow them); supra notes 245-46 and accompanying
text.
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fraudulent behavior. The possibility of such a limited remedy for
fraud would create an uncertain marketplace-where sellers
would not be held to their representations and buyers could not
rely on explicit representations by the seller."' Judge Posner
recently explained that such a rule invariably would increase
costs for all commercial transactions:
If commercial fraud [is eliminated by the economic loss rule],
then prospective parties to contracts will be able to obtain
legal protection against fraud only by insisting that the other
party to the contract reduce all representations to writing,
and so there will be additional contractual negotiations, con-
tracts will be longer, and in short, transactional costs will be
higher. And the additional costs will be incurred in the mak-
ing of every commercial contract, not just the tiny fraction
that end up in litigation."'
Even if the buyer reduces all representations to writing and
recovers under an express warranty, the seller would not be
liable for inducing a contract that, but for the misrepresenta-
tions, would not have been made. 68 Failing to hold the seller
liable for fraud does not provide the buyer with a full and
adequate remedy without any policy justifying the result.
The underlying problem with the Florida and Michigan limita-
tions on the fraudulent inducement exception is that they rest
on a misunderstanding of the tort of fraud in the inducement.269
266. See Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (W.D.
Wis. 1997) (stating that a requirement that the economic loss rule bars intentional
misrepresentation claims "would not be conducive to amicable commercial relations").
267. All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (em-
phases added); see also Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Robert Levin Carpet Co.,
No. Civ. 98-CV-5884, 1999 WL 387329, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1999) (requiring
that any representations, even those that fraudulently induced the transaction, if
material, must be "set forth in the parties' integrated distribution agreements");
Pressman v. Wolf, 732 So. 2d 356, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (dismissing fraudu-
lent inducement claims because of the existence of an "as is" contract).
268. See Dexter Corp. v. Shittaker Corp., 926 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If
[plaintiff] proves fraud, it can obtain all its compensatory damages and more and
can forget about the contract."); see also Tourek et al., supra note 254, at 882 (ex-
plaining that it is "well-recognized that fraudulently obtained contracts are voidable
as a matter of law").
269. See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 114748 (E.D.
Wis. 1998).
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Fraud in the inducement is defined as "[m]isrepresentation as to
the terms, quality or other contractual relation, venture or other
transaction that leads a person to agree to enter into the trans-
action with a false impression or understanding of the risks,
duties or obligations she has undertaken."270 Whereas the fraud-
ulent inducement is always interwoven with the contract, the
tort itself is always independent of the contract. 7' The Huron
Tool court, then, was correct to distinguish the fact that fraudu-
lent inducement claims, not fraudulent performance claims, are
exceptions to the economic loss rule. 72 By imposing the additional
requirement, however, the court vitiated the exception and for
all practical purposes created no exception at all.27
Fraud in the inducement must always be interwoven with the
contract because the tort of fraud is the inducement of someone
to enter into a contract 4 The distinguishing determination is
whether the fraud arises from inducement or performance; the
former is a tort, the latter arises only under contract law.2 75 If
the fraud took place prior to entering the contract, then it is
fraud in the inducement; if not, it is breach of contract. 7  Conse-
quently, all fraud in the inducement claims should be exceptions
270. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 661 (6th ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 530(1) (1977) ("A representation of the maker's own intention to do or
not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention.").
271. See Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; see also supra notes 99-107 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the rationales for creating a true fraud exception to the eco-
nomic loss rule).
272. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing Huron Tool).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29; see also supra note 142 (discussing
the varied application of the Florida economic loss rule). Compare supra notes 123-
24 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Huron Tool limitation),
with supra notes 145-50 (discussing the results in Flagg Energy).
274. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 104-06
and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the duty for fraud).
275. See Sun Co. (R&M) v. Badger Design & Constr., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 365, 370
(E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[Mlere non-performance ... is not evidence of fraud."); Oxford
Indus. v. Luminco, Inc., No. 86-6417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7099, at *13 (E.D. Pa.
May 22, 1991) ("An unperformed promise does not give rise to a presumption that
the promisor intended not to perform when the promise was made, and a fraudulent
intention will not be inferred merely from its nonperformance." (quoting Fidurski v.
Hammill, 328 Pa. 1, 2 (1937))).
276. See Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147-48; see also supra notes 46-49, 62-63 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between tort and contract).
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to the economic loss rule.277 Both the California Court of Appeals
and the Texas Supreme Court correctly recognized that fraud is
separate and distinct from a contract because the duty imposed
is the abstention from inducing another to enter into a contract
through the use of misrepresentations. 278 The duty not to lie in
contract negotiations differs substantially from a broken con-
279tractual promise. In short, fraud consists of a promise never
intended to be performed (i.e., a lie) while breach consists of a
promise intended to be performed but is not performed (i.e., a
broken promise).
The test to determine whether a plaintiff has properly asserted
a tort claim does not rest on the determination of whether the
damages are physical or economic. Purely economic loss is recov-
erable under a variety of tort theories, including fraud.280 In-
stead, the question of whether a plaintiff correctly asserted a
fraudulent inducement claim depends on the source of the du-
ty.211 If the duty arises solely from a provision contained within
the contract, then the plaintiff has asserted a contract action.282
Conversely, if the plaintiffs allegations concern misrepresenta-
tions made during contract negotiations, then the claim is a
tort.2" Mere failure to perform a contract does not constitute
fraud, but a party can be held liable for fraud when that party
makes a misrepresentation without the intent to perform and
another party is induced into a transaction.2 4 So long as the
277. See Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147-48; supra text accompanying notes 42-46
(defining the economic loss rule and explaining that the heart of the economic loss
rule is to distinguish tort and contract claims).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 96-107.
279. See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (E.D.
Wis. 1999) (explaining that "the duty of honesty when negotiating a contract is not
an obligation imposed by the contract, which does not yet exist, but instead by the
common law"); Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147-48.
280. See supra notes 5-6.
281. See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining that contract law arises
from agreements of the parties); see also Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (explaining
that a representation made after the existence of the contract did not constitute
fraudulent inducement); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones
& Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (same).
283. See Griffin Plumbing & Heating, 463 S.E.2d at 88; supra notes 103-07 and ac-
companying text.
284. See Royal Palm Say. Ass'n v. Pine Trace Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (M.D.
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allegation concerns a misrepresentation made prior to the con-
tract that induced the contract, it is a fraudulent inducement
claim.
The economic loss rule clearly seeks to prevent the mere re-
casting of a contract claim sounding as a tort of fraud in the
inducement,285 because tort law does not protect parties from
breach of duties assumed only by agreement.211 Courts correctly
recognize that "almost any contract claim can be framed as a
fraud in the inducement."28 The test to determine whether a
plaintiff has a fraudulent inducement action is not to examine
"the gist of the action"288 by determining if the terms are "insep-
arably embodied in the parties' subsequent agreement"28 9 nor the
nature of the damages claimed.290 These indicators suggest only
that there might be a recasting of the contract claim; they are
the beginning, not the end, of the determination.
The true test of a claim rests on the duty involved29' and the
significance of the representation: (1) Did the duty arise before
the contract, and (2) if the misrepresentation had been known to
the defrauded party, would there have been no deal?292 When a
plaintiff does not allege merely that the defendant failed to keep
Fla. 1989).
285. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Roxborough Village Joint Venture, 944 F.
Supp. 827, 831 (D. Colo. 1996).
286. See Palco Linings v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
287. Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Puff 'N Stuff of Winter Park, Inc. v. Bell, 683 So. 2d 1176, 1179
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
288. The "gist of the action" doctrine determines whether the gravamen of the
complaint sounds in tort or contract. See Sundquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 644, 651 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
289. See, e.g., Hotels of Key Largo, 694 So. 2d at 77.
290. See DeWitt County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex. 1999)
(explaining that the "measure of damages, standing alone, is not always determina-
tive of whether a tort claim can co-exist with a breach of contract claim").
291. See 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel &
Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 351 (IM. 1990) ("[Tlhe concept of duty is at the heart
of ... the economic loss rule.").
292. Cf Douglas-Hanson Co. v. BF Goodrich Co., 598 N.W.2d 262, 270-71 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999) (determining that fraudulent misrepresentations that actually induce a
contract create an exception to the economic loss rule, but declining to address
whether the economic loss rule would bar misrepresentation claims that do not actu-
ally induce the contract).
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its promise, but that either the defendant made a false state-
ment that induced the contract or that the defendant never
intended to keep the agreement, the plaintiff has properly
claimed fraudulent inducement.293
The validity of this test is evidenced by the fact that "[f]raud
destroys all consent."2 If the defrauded party's reliance on the
misrepresentation induced the contract, and the representation,
if not true, was a deal-breaker, then the plaintiff has truly pled
a fraudulent inducement claim. Unfortunately, such a determi-
nation must be made on a case-by-case basis; it cannot be ap-
plied in a simplistic fashion by merely looking to see if the mis-
representations are "interwoven" into the contract. The misrep-
resentations will necessarily concern the heart of the parties'
agreement.2 95 A misrepresentation that is collateral to, or a mi-
nor part of, the contract is not a deal-breaker. If the misrepre-
sentation is such that there would have been no contract if the
truth were known, the party has been tricked into contracting.296
Because of the misrepresentation, the plaintiff entered into a
contract to which he would not have otherwise agreed.291 In
293. See City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446-
47 (4th Cir. 1990).
294. Ganley Bros., Inc. v. Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 212 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1927);
see ALCES, supra note 224, §3.01, at 3-3.
295. Fraud in the inducement occurs when a party is induced to enter a contract
.as when a seller misrepresents the quality of goods." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 4.10, at 249 (2d ed. 1990); see also Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Robert
Levin Carpet Co., No. Civ. A. 98-CV-5884, 1999 WL 387329, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 20,
1999) (explaining that material factors to agreements are included in the subject
matter of contracts); Eclipse Med., Inc. v. American Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc.,
No. 96-8532-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1999 WL 181412, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 1999) (ex-
plaining that "if the representation was not important enough to make it into the
comprehensive written agreement it must not have been material").
296. See Huron Tool & Eng'g v. Precision Consulting Servs., 532 N.W.2d 541, 545
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that fraud in the inducement undermines a party's
ability to negotiate freely); Douglas-Hanson, 598 N.W.2d at 268 (explaining that
fraud undermines "one party's ability to negotiate fair terms and make an informed
decision").
297.
[A] material misrepresentation of fact may render a contract void or void-
able .... The economic loss doctrine does not apply to fraudulently in-
duced contracts because the person fraudulently induced ... can affirm
or avoid the contract, and ... has the option of selecting tort or contract
damages. That option is inconsistent with the economic loss doctrine ....
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essence, no agreement exists when the contract is based on
fraud.
A case-by-case analysis requires that the court examine the
evidence supporting the plaintiffs claims. The fact-intensive na-
ture of a fraud claim298 suggests that the bottom line of this
analysis rests not on the economic loss rule, but on whether the
plaintiff has enough facts to support a fraudulent inducement
claim. 99 To survive judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff
must have sufficient facts to show (1) that the defendant inten-
tionally misrepresented a material fact to induce the contract or
the defendant's intent at the time prior to the contract was not
to fulfill its promise, and (2) that had the plaintiff known that
the representation was false, the plaintiff would not have en-
tered into the contract.
This approach properly balances the interests of the economic
loss rule and fraud claims. First, it preserves the essence of the
fraudulent inducement claim, which responds to the concern of
critics who allege that courts are using the economic loss rule as
an "analysis-lacking short-cut" or merely as a tool of "judicial
economy."3 Second, it suggests that fraudulent inducement re-
quires not just reliance on the precontractual misrepresentation,
but that without the misrepresentation, no contract would have
been formed. By focusing both on the timing and significance of
the representation, this approach responds to the concern that
which requires the contract to be affirmed.
Douglas-Hanson, 598 N.W.2d at 268-69 (citations omitted).
298. At least one court has explained that the nature and subtleties of a fraud
claim are such that fraud requires a full explanation of facts and circumstances to
permit a proper determination that seldom can be made without a full trial. See
Nessim v. DeLoache, 384 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
299. See Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(explaining that "[firaud is ordinarily inappropriate for summary disposition; only
after a full explanation of the facts and circumstances cai the occurrence of fraud
be determined"); Nepomoceno v. Knights of Columbus, No. Civ. A. 96-C-4789, 1999
WL 66570, at *11, *12-*14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999) (recognizing the fact-intensive na-
ture of misrepresentation claims). Compare All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp.,
174 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 1999) (evaluating fraud claims on the merits), with J
Square Enters. v. Regner, 734 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming
the trial court's dismissal of fraud claims based on the economic loss rule), and
Clayton v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (affirming the dismissal of fraud claims based on the economic loss rule).
300. See supra note 215.
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any contract claim can be converted into a fraudulent induce-
ment claim.30 ' The similarity of claims for breach of an express
warranty and fraud evidences that allowing simultaneous claims
to proceed will not unnecessarily burden the defendant or the
court.3 2 Finally, focusing on the timing and importance of the
misrepresentation preserves fraud as a viable claim that co-
exists with contract claims, as it developed in the common law30 3
and as contemplated by the drafters of the UCC.
3 °4
What Should Be the Rule for Negligent Misrepresentation-Is It
More Akin to Fraud or Negligence?
The disparate treatment of negligent misrepresentation by the
courts demonstrates the true debate over application of the eco-
nomic loss rule to negligent misrepresentation claims. The Florida
rule treats negligent misrepresentation as if it were similar to a
fraudulent inducement claim; Texas and Illinois treat negligent
misrepresentation as more akin to negligence. Although negli-
gent misrepresentation does not require fraud's concomitant
intent to deceive, it "is founded on the breach of a duty separate
and distinct from the duty abolished by the economic loss
rule.3 05
The duty imposed by negligent misrepresentation is "to exer-
cise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicat-
ing information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions."3 6 The goal of the economic loss rule is to prevent
parties from extricating themselves from the bargains struck
from freely negotiated transactions. °7 Negligent misrepresenta-
301. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
302. Indeed, pleading fraud also comes with safeguards against false claims, such
as the requirement of pleading fraud with particularity and, in most jurisdictions the
burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponder-
ance of the evidence. See All-Tech Telecom, 174 F.3d at 866; see also Tourek et al.,
supra note 254, at 919-21 (arguing that a host of provisions in the rules of proce-
dure protect against improper allegations of fraud).
303. See supra notes 93, 215, 255 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
305. State v. United States Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 302 (Haw. 1996).
306. Id. at 303; see also supra note 155 (setting forth section 552 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts).
307. See supra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
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tion imposes a duty of care when the defendant supplies infor-
mation intended for the guidance of others. 8 In a negligent
misrepresentation case, the plaintiff relies on that information
and experiences business losses as a result.
3 09
Like fraud, negligent misrepresentation also expressly pro-
vides for the recovery of purely economic losses. 10 Although the
economic loss rule bars claims for disappointed economic expec-
tations where commercial law provides an adequate remedy,31
the UCC clearly allows supplemental common law claims not
only for fraud, but also for negligent misrepresentation.3 2 At
least in the case of third parties, negligent misrepresentation
does not protect the same interest that contract law and the
UCC protect.3
13
Adopting a view that negligent misrepresentation is so akin
to negligence that the economic loss rule bars its application
ignores the express intention of the UCC to allow fraud and
negligent misrepresentation defenses to supplement the Code.314
The "in the business" requirement crafted by the Illinois courts
raises several problems. First, the Illinois courts have failed 'to
articulate a clear and concise test to determine who is "in the
business of supplying information for the guidance of others,3 15
or to explain why certain professions are included and others
excluded.316 The "in the business" requirement also ignores the
plain language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restate-
ment requires only that the supplier of information provide
the information "in the course of his business... or em-
ployment" or supply information in connection with "any other
308. See John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Tenn.
1991); supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
309. See John Martin, 819 S.W.2d at 430-31.
310. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977). Although the majority
of states do not allow for recovery of benefit of the bargain damages for negligent
misrepresentation, a few states do. See, e.g., Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc.,
824 F. Supp. 444, 451 (D. Vt. 1993).
311. See State v. United States Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 306 (Haw. 1996).
312. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999); supra notes 254-55.
313. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
314. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
315. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (IlM. 1982); see
also supra notes 174-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Moorman doctrine).
316. See supra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
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transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest."17 A proper
defendant is one who either is paid to provide information, for
example, an accountant or an attorney, or one who does not
receive compensation for the information, but nonetheless has a
pecuniary interest in the transaction. 18
All that a negligent misrepresentation claim requires is that
the information be given in the course of the defendant's busi-
ness, even if no consideration exists for the information itself,
and that the defendant have a pecuniary interest in the underly-
ing transaction.3 9 The Restatement also does not explicitly re-
quire that the plaintiff and the defendant not be in privity-only
that the information be intended for the guidance of others:
3 20
Although... the bulk of the decisions stem from factual
situations involving damage... [to] third parties... this
alone does not compel a narrow reading of section 552 that
limits its applicability solely to such situations or precludes
its applicability... to parties... in which the providers of
information are involved. 21
The Illinois "in the business" requirement is correctly applied
when there is a direct relationship between the parties and an
inequality of knowledge or bargaining power. Where the infor-
mation supplier has a direct relationship with the relying party
and the nature of the contractual relationship is based on the in-
formation supplier's superior knowledge, the aggrieved party
should have a negligent misrepresentation claim. This reasoning
is consistent with other jurisdictions that have specifically ex-
empted the economic loss rule's application to professional negli-
gence claims.322
Allowing an exception for any party in privity, due merely to a
negotiated contract, to seek redress through a claim of negligent
misrepresentation has the potential to vitiate the economic loss
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
318. See, e.g., infra notes 331-36 and accompanying text (discussing Wassal v.
Payne).
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmts. c-d.
320. See id. § 552.
321. State v. United States Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 311 (Haw. 1996).
322. See, e.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999); Clark v. Rowe,
701 N.E.2d 624 (Mass. 1998).
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rule. It is precisely for this reason that "[w]ith increasing fre-
quency, plaintiffs are presenting their negligence claims"-or
more accurately their contract claims-"in the form of negligent
misrepresentation in an attempt to circumvent the economic loss
rule." 23 An action for negligent misrepresentation when the
parties are in privity is indistinguishable from an action for
breach of contract:" "If one is unable to meet his [contractual]
obligation... has he not 'negligently misrepresented' his ability
to do so?"325 If this is truly the intent of allowing an exception
for "independent torts" it would be better "to drive that final
coffin-nail" into the economic loss rule.3 26 Because the economic
loss rule permits and encourages parties to allocate risk through
contract negotiations,32' a tort action for negligent misrepresen-
tation where the parties are in privity of contract affords no
alternative relief other than to allow the parties to extricate
themselves from a fairly negotiated bargain. 328 Thus, for sophis-
ticated commercial entities who deal with each other at arms
length in contract negotiations, the economic loss rule should
prevent recovery in negligent misrepresentation.
The question of recovery for third parties presents an entirely
different analysis. To apply the economic loss rule to bar negli-
gent misrepresentation claims by third parties would restore the
"citadel of privity" that insulated defendants from liability
caused by misperformance of a contractual duty.3 29 Reviewing
323. Fox & Loftus, supra note 163, at 268.
324. See ALCES, supra note 224, § 2.0213][b], at 2-20; see also Sunquest Info. Sys.,
Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 644, 651 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (ex-
plaining that a negligent misrepresentation claim between two parties in privity is
"merely another way of stating [a] breach of contract claim." (quoting Factory Mkt.,
Inc. v. Schuller Inl, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 387, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1997))).
325. Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. G6V Assocs., Ltd., 710 So. 2d 702,
705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
326. Id.
327. See Berschauer/Philips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986,
990 (Wash. 1994); supra notes 51-55, 65-70 and accompanying text.
328. See City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 840 (Haw. 1998).
329. See Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
560 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ohio 1990) (Brown, J., dissenting) (making a similar point);
Rosseau v. KN. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999) (explaining that when
the citadel of privity fell, it eliminated the consideration of whether privity exists in
a tort action); supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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the facts of Glanzer, it is easy to see how courts rejecting a
third-party privity exception to the economic loss rule would pre-
vent liability to the bean-weigher today."' 0
Wassall v. W.H. Payne3. illustrates perhaps the best example
of how the economic loss rule should apply to negligent misrep-
resentation. In Wassall, the defendant made representations to
the plaintiff and a third party about the flooding propensity of a
piece of property. 32 The defendant knew at the time of negotia-
tions that the third party intended to buy the land and then
lease it to the plaintiff.33 3 Both the plaintiff and the third party
relied on the misrepresentation in entering into their respective
transactions. 3' Similarly, the plaintiff in Glanzer was not in
privity with the defendant and sought purely economic losses
-damages incurred as a result of the weigher's negligent supply
of information about the weight of the beans. 35 Accordingly,
both plaintiffs should be and were entitled to recover.
The outcome in Wassal demonstrates the sound reasoning of
Glanzer, but an overbroad application of the economic loss rule,
as some courts suggest, threatens to eliminate the reasoning of
Glanzer altogether. Such an example establishes the correct
application of the economic loss rule to negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims: When a foreseeable plaintiff, although not in privity,
relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in entering into his
transaction, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover from the
defendant as a result of justifiable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentations. 3 6 As Justice Cardozo recognized, potential
pitfalls exist if the scope of negligent misrepresentation is un-
limited.3 7 The extent of foreseeability of the plaintiff in relying
330. Compare supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing Glanzer v.
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922)), with supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text
(discussing the application of the economic loss rule to bar negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims by third parties).




335. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing Glanzer).
336. See Wassall, 682 So. 2d at 681.
337. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445-46 (N.Y. 1931); supra note
158.
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on the information is a question to be resolved by determination
of the individual claim, it is not one to be resolved by a univer-
sal application of the economic loss rule to bar negligent misrep-
resentation claims by third parties.
CONCLUSION
The economic loss rule has become the rule of law in almost
every jurisdiction. As application of the rule expands beyond the
contours of products liability, applicability of the doctrine to
torts other than strict liability and negligence has come to the
forefront. The recent trend by courts in crafting an exception for
intentional torts, including fraud, is correct. At least in part,
states adopt the economic loss rule to promote predictable and
uniform results in commercial transactions. Yet variation in
methods of applying the economic loss rule to misrepresentation
claims threatens to undermine that uniformity.
In applying the doctrine to misrepresentation claims, courts
should be mindful of the basic purpose of the economic loss
rule-to prevent the law of contract and the law of tort from
dissolving into each other and the simple proposition that fraud
unravels a contract. Just as overextension of products liability
would drown contract in a sea of tort, so too would overapplica-
tion of the economic loss rule drown misrepresentation claims in
a sea of contract. An analysis of the nature of damages and
whether the misrepresentation is interwoven into the contract
only suggests further analysis is required.
When fraudulent misrepresentations procure a contract, there
is no agreement. In determining whether a contract truly was
procured by fraud, courts should examine when the alleged mis-
representation was made and the significance of the misrepre-
sentation. This analysis will ensure that the economic loss rule
does not eviscerate a valid fraudulent inducement claim.
In contrast, creating an exception for a negligent misrepresen-
tation claim between sophisticated commercial entities in privity
does not protect an independent duty. Allowing those parties to
escape their agreement merely by pleading negligent misrepre-
sentation would vitiate the economic loss rule. The tort of negli-
gent misrepresentation has its historic origins in protecting
third parties. Accordingly an economic loss rule limitation on a
third party's negligent misrepresentation claim serves no pur-
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pose, other than to contradict the express reasons for the tort;
Unfettered application of the economic loss rule could poten-
tially eviscerate fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.
Without workable exceptions for fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation, a judicial rule will eliminate a remedy where the
policy justification is absent.338 As the Florida Supreme Court
recently cautioned:
[Tihe economic loss rule [has] ... genuine, but limited, value
[but it was] never intended to bar well-established common
law causes of action.... Rather, the rule was primarily in-
tended to limit actions in the products liability context, and
its application should generally be limited to those contexts
or situations where the policy considerations are substantially
identical to those underlying the product liability type analy-
sis .... The rule should not be invoked to bar well-estab-
lished causes of action in tort.33 9
Prohibiting otherwise viable misrepresentation claims because
of an improper expansion of the economic loss rule creates a
system of recovery resting on the very ground that Justice
Traynor sought to avoid in Seely: the "luck" of one plaintiff ver-
sus another.34 ° To permit such a result would contravene a fun-
damental duty of government to afford its citizens redress in the
courts for injury, as "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury."34'
R. Joseph Barton
338. See, e.g., supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text (discussing the unavailability
of remedies for the FRT-plywood plaintiffs).
339. Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999); see also Comptech Int'l,
Inc. v. Milamn Commerce Park, Ltd., No. 93,336, 1999 WL 983857, at *6-*7 (Fla. Oct.
28, 1999) (reiterating this caution and quoting portions of it).
340. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). More precisely,
it rests on the luck of the defendant that the plaintiff will not discover its fraudu-
lent misrepresentations within the UCC's statute of limitations.
341. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla.
1993) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the lack of a remedy due to the ap-
plication of the economic loss rule violated the Florida constitution); Ned Miltenberg,
The Revolutionary "Right to a Remedy," TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 48 n.1 (listing the 38
state constitutions providing a right to a remedy).
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